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Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes
Robert H. Sitkoff and Max Matthew Schanzenbach
Abstract
This paper presents the results of the first empirical study of the domestic ju-
risdictional competition for trust funds. In order to open a loophole in the federal
estate tax, a rash of states have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities. Based on
reports to federal banking authorities, we find that through 2003 a state’s abolition
of the Rule increased its trust assets by $6 billion (a 20 percent increase on av-
erage) and increased its average trust account size by $200,000. These estimates
imply that roughly $100 billion in trust funds have moved to take advantage of the
abolition of the Rule. Interestingly, states that levied an income tax on trust funds
attracted from out of state experienced no increase in trust business after abolish-
ing the Rule. This is a striking finding for the theory of jurisdictional competition,
because it implies that abolishing the Rule does not directly increase a state’s tax
revenue. Yet the jurisdictional competition for trust funds is patently real and pro-
found. Our findings also speak to unresolved issues of policy concerning state
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ABSTRACT 
This Essay presents the results of the first empirical 
study of the domestic jurisdictional competition for trust 
funds. Since 1986, a third of the states have abolished the 
Rule Against Perpetuities to open a loophole in the federal 
estate tax. Since 1997, a handful of states have validated 
self-settled asset protection trusts, which allow the settler to 
shield assets from creditors. Based on reports to federal 
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banking authorities, we find that through 2003 a state’s 
abolition of the Rule increased its reported trust assets by 
$6 billion (a 20% increase on average) and increased its av-
erage trust account size by $200,000. By contrast, our ex-
amination of self-settled asset protection trusts yielded in-
determinate results. Our perpetuities findings imply that 
roughly $100 billion in trust funds have moved to take ad-
vantage of the abolition of the Rule. Interestingly, states 
that levied an income tax on trust funds attracted from out 
of state experienced no increase in trust business after abol-
ishing the Rule. This finding has relevance for the study of 
jurisdictional competition, because it implies that abolish-
ing the Rule does not directly increase a state’s tax revenue. 
Yet the jurisdictional competition for trust funds is patently 
real and profound. Our findings also speak to unresolved is-





By year end 2004, twenty states had validated perpetual trusts by 
abolishing the centuries-old Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule or 
the RAP) as applied to interests in trust. The driving force for this 
abrupt turnabout was not a careful reconsideration of the ancient 
common law policy against perpetuities, but rather a 1986 reform to 
the federal tax code. Under the 1986 code (as amended through 
2005), a transferor can pass $1 million during life, or $1.5 million at 
death, free of federal wealth transfer taxes.1 By placing this $1 mil-
lion or $1.5 million in a trust, successive generations can benefit from 
the trust fund, free from federal wealth transfer taxes, for as long as 
state perpetuities law will allow the trust to endure. In a state that has 
abolished the Rule, successive generations can benefit from the trust 
fund, free of subsequent federal wealth transfer taxation, forever. 
This Essay presents the results of the first empirical study of the 
jurisdictional competition for trust funds. Based on state-level panel 
data assembled from annual reports to federal banking authorities by 
institutional trustees, we find that the interstate competition for trust 
 
1. Federal wealth transfer taxes comprise estate, gift, and generation-skipping 
transfer (GST) taxes. For an accessible introduction, see STEPHANIE J. WILLBANKS, 
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE (3d ed. 2004). 
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funds is both real and profound. Our analysis indicates that through 
2003, a state’s abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities increased its 
reported trust assets by about $6 billion and its average trust account 
size by roughly $200,000. To put these figures in perspective, in 2003 
the average state had roughly $19 billion in reported trust assets and 
an average account size of about $1 million. In the timeframe of our 
data, sixteen states abolished the Rule, implying that through 2003 
roughly $100 billion in trust assets have moved as a result of the 
Rule’s abolition.2  This figure represents about 10% of the total trust 
assets reported to federal banking authorities in 2003. 
Prior to our study, the evidence of jurisdictional competition in 
trust law was anecdotal. Lawyers and bankers in New York and other 
states that have not abolished the Rule regularly complain about the 
loss of billions of dollars in trust business to South Dakota, Delaware, 
and other trust-friendly jurisdictions.3 The practitioner journals on es-
tate planning are rife with assessments of the different state laws and 
advertisements by banks and trust companies touting the virtues of 
one state or another.4 Anecdotes of competition have even been re-
ported by popular media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal, New 
York Times, and Forbes Magazine.5 
In spite of this anecdotal evidence, before our study there were at 
least two reasons to be dubious about the magnitude of the jurisdic-
tional competition for trust funds. First, no state collects a filing or 
other fee on the creation of a private trust under its law, and several 
 
2. The $100 billion figure is only a point estimate. For discussion of this esti-
mate and its confidence interval, see infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
3. See, e.g., Charles F. Gibbs & Colleen Carew, Trusts Leaving New York, Situs 
in Cyberspace: Time for Legislation?, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 2002, at 3 (“Our New 
York state trust banker friends have been proclaiming for some years now a sub-
stantial loss of trust business to Delaware, South Dakota, and other more-hospitable 
venues.”); Thomas Scheffey, Is Immortality Just Around The Corner? “Dead 
Hand” Trust Law Relaxes Its Grip, CONN. L. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2002, at 10 (noting that 
Connecticut lawyers and bankers were lobbying for repeal of the Rule); Charles F. 
Gibbs & Marilyn Ordover, An Open Letter to Assemblywoman Ann Carrozza, 
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at 3 (arguing that “to remain competitive with the other 
states,” New York must repeal the RAP). 
4. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN & 
ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 714 (7th ed. 2005) (reproduc-
ing a Wells Fargo ad touting South Dakota as a “place where there is no rule 
against perpetuities” and “no fiduciary income tax”); Daniel G. Worthington, The 
Problems and Promise of Perpetual Trusts Laws, TR. & EST., Dec. 2004, at 15. 
5. See Carole Gould, Shifting Rules Add Luster to Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 
2000, § 3; Rachel Emma Silverman, States Toss Out Restrictions on Creating Per-
petual Trusts; Downside—Fees Lost Forever, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at 
D1; John Turrettini, Providing for the Year 3000, FORBES, June 11, 2001, at 220. In 
February 2005, the Wall Street Journal published an article summarizing our find-
ings as reported in an earlier draft. Rachel Emma Silverman, Looser Trust Laws 
Lure $100 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at D1; see also Bruce W. Fraser, 
The Rush To Dynasty Trusts, FIN. ADV., June 2005, at 111 (same). 
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of the leading jurisdictions that have abolished the Rule do not levy 
income taxes on trust funds attracted from out of state.6 Hence, in 
these states there is no direct state revenue payoff from attracting 
trust funds. 
Second, the main tax benefits of a trust not subject to the Rule 
Against Perpetuities accrue not to the donor, but to beneficiaries 
whose interest in the trust will not vest within twenty-one years of the 
death of a life in being at the time the trust became irrevocable. 
Hence, as compared to an ordinary in-state trust, the added benefits 
of settling an out-of-state perpetual trust flow to beneficiaries who are 
remote descendants unknown to the donor.7 
Accordingly, the absence of empirical study of the jurisdictional 
competition for trust funds represents a gaping hole in the literature. 
This lacuna stems from the difficulties that inhere in such a project. 
First, because inter vivos trusts are private arrangements for which 
there are no public filings, it is commonly assumed that data is un-
available. For example, Jesse Dukeminier and James Krier, authors of 
a widely-used casebook on property law, believe that “[i]t is difficult 
to get hard data on the popularity of perpetual trusts among consum-
ers.”8 Likewise, Eric Rakowski has written that “[t]here is no way to 
count [perpetual trusts] with certainty.”9 In a similar vein, the English 
Law Commission, which in the 1990s was tasked to make recom-
mendations on perpetuities reform in England, “considered the possi-
bility of commissioning a full study of the economic implications of 
abolishing the rule,” but declined to do so “because it proved impos-
sible to obtain sufficient data.”10 
Second, the domestic perpetual-trust phenomenon exists at the in-
tersection of several varied and complex bodies of law including the 
 
6. More precisely, these states do not levy a tax on income in a trust consisting 
of stocks, bonds, and other financial assets if the trust was settled by a nonresident 
for the benefit of nonresidents even if an in-state bank or trust company serves as 
trustee and the trust provides that it is to be governed by the law of that state. See 
infra Subsection II.D.2. 
7.  For example, suppose that the donor’s grandchild is living at the time the 
trust becomes irrevocable. That grandchild is a measuring life validating a remain-
der in that grandchild’s unborn children, who would be the transferor’s great-
grandchildren. In such a scenario, assuming the trust is for that particular grand-
child’s branch of the family only, the first generation for which abolition of the 
Rule makes a difference is that of the donor’s great-great-grandchildren, who share 
only a 6.25% genetic overlap with the donor. We thank Lawrence Waggoner for 
suggesting the genetic calculation.  
8. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1315 (2003). 
9. Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the Disembodied Will, 4 POL. PHIL. & 
ECON. 91, 124 n.8 (2005). 
10. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 251, THE RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND 
EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATIONS 20 (1998). 
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Rule Against Perpetuities, federal wealth transfer taxes, and state fi-
duciary income taxes. Designing an empirical study of the perpetual-
trust phenomenon thus requires sensitivity to each of those fields. 
Moreover, to avoid omitting other potentially relevant variables, em-
pirical study of the perpetual-trust phenomenon also requires ac-
counting for other possible margins of jurisdictional competition for 
trust funds. Perhaps the most significant is the rise of the self-settled 
asset protection trust (APT). Contrary to traditional law, in a jurisdic-
tion that has validated APTs, the settlor can shield assets from credi-
tors by placing them in a trust for his or her own benefit.  
 Our findings provide strong evidence of a national market for 
trust funds that is responsive to the interplay between state trust law 
and federal tax law. Contrary to the standard theoretical and practical 
accounts of jurisdictional competition, which view increased state tax 
revenue as the incentive for states to compete,11 we find that the only 
states that experienced an increase in trust business after abolishing 
the Rule were those that did not levy an income tax on trust funds at-
tracted from out of state. Although in tension with the dominant 
model of jurisdictional competition, this finding is strongly intuitive. 
The demand for perpetual trusts stems largely from their utility in 
avoiding federal wealth transfer taxes.12 Donors who are who are 
sensitive to the federal transfer taxes are likely also to be sensitive to 
state income taxes. 
Our findings have broad implications for both policy and theory. 
Regarding policy, we find strong evidence that transferors have been 
escaping the Rule’s application at an increasingly rapid pace since the 
mid-1990s..  Although neither the federal wealth transfer taxes nor 
the interstate competition for trust funds bear on the policies under-
pinning the Rule, together they have mortally wounded the Rule by 
reducing it to a mere transaction cost.  Accordingly, to the extent that 
the policies underpinning the Rule continue to have contemporary 
relevance, it is necessary to look elsewhere to service those policies.  
Our results are also relevant to the ongoing policy debate over the 
future of federal wealth transfer taxation, now before Congress.13 A 
 
11. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 
6-16 (1993); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of 
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 
GEO. L.J. 201, 235-39 (1987); Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of 
Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. POL. ECON. 
1197, 1204-10 (1981); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Consti-
tutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 945-949 (2005). 
12. See Max Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes: Ex-
plaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.  ___  (forthcoming 
2006). 
13. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE 
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principal tax policy underlying the 1986 code, the relevant features of 
which remain in effect today, is to prevent the “enjoyment of prop-
erty followed by its movement down the generations without being 
subjected to estate or gift tax.”14 If Congress wants to put this policy 
into practice, it will need to close the loophole opened by the states 
that have abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities. Successful imple-
mentation of federal tax policy necessarily requires attention to its in-
teraction with state property law. It is thus worth noting that, in a re-
cent report, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation proposed 
closing the perpetuities loophole—but its analysis is based in part on 
an empirical assumption that we show to be erroneous.15 
On a theoretical level, our findings are relevant to the ongoing 
scholarly debate over the nature of jurisdictional competition. Our 
findings not only contradict the simple, state revenue-based model, 
but they also cast doubt on recent high-profile work that, by showing 
a lack of tax revenue from attracting new business, questions the ex-
istence of the phenomenon.16 Instead, our findings lend support to an 
interest-group model, one that is rooted in public choice theory.17 
Even if attracting business does not have an immediate impact on the 
state’s tax revenue, local interest groups may nonetheless benefit 
from, and hence lobby for, laws that will attract business to the state. 
The rest of the Essay is organized as follows. Part I motivates the 
empirical analysis and explains the relevant legal issues: the race to 
abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, the pertinent features of the 
federal wealth transfer tax system, the state taxation of trust income, 
and the controversial recognition of self-settled asset protection 
trusts. Part II describes the dataset and briefly addresses its limita-
tions. Part III presents the empirical analysis, which proceeds in three 
steps. First, we present an initial analysis of the raw data. In some key 
states, the effect of abolishing the Rule is readily apparent and simple 
 
AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 392-424 (Jan. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf; infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
14. JEFFREY N. PENNELL, WEALTH TRANSFER PLANNING AND DRAFTING 18-27 
(2005); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 824-25 (1985); JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, supra note 13, at 394; WILLBANKS, supra note 1, § 15.07. 
15. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 392-95. This report is 
discussed in the text accompanying notes 174-175. 
16. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely 
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 
(2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).  
17. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Geof-
frey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political 
Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 
1143-49 (2002). 
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graphical depictions are highly suggestive. Second, we present a 
more formal econometric analysis that employs a standard difference-
in-difference regression methodology that controls for contempora-
neous changes in state law and relevant economic factors. Third, we 
offer a nontechnical summary of our principal findings. Part IV as-
sesses the implications of our findings for the various policy and 
scholarly debates identified above. After a short conclusion, the ta-
bles summarizing our regression results (Tables 1–4), our dating of 
trust law changes (Table 5), and two substantive appendices follow. 
I. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR TRUST FUNDS 
In this Essay we examine the effect of abolishing the Rule 
Against Perpetuities on a state’s trust business. To do so, however, 
we must also account for other state trust and tax laws that might im-
pact a donor’s choice of jurisdiction. Accordingly, in this Part we re-
view: (1) the Rule Against Perpetuities; (2) the relevance of the Rule 
for minimizing federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer 
taxes (collectively, the federal wealth transfer taxes); (3) the contro-
versial authorization of self-settled asset-protection trusts; and (4) the 
state income taxation of trust funds attracted from out of state. 
A. The Rule Against Perpetuities18 
Few rules of property law are as storied as the Rule Against Per-
petuities. The classic formulation is that of John Chipman Gray: “No 
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one 
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”19 The pe-
riod of the Rule reflects a common law policy that a transferor should 
be allowed to tie up property for only so long as the life of anyone 
possibly known to the transferor plus the next generation’s minority 
(hence lives in being plus 21 years).20  
 
18. Portions of this section draw on DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 674-
77, 686, 695-99. 
19. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th 
ed. 1942).  
20. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16, at 51 (A. James Casner ed., 
1952) (noting that the Rule permits “a man of property . . . [to] provide for all of those 
in his family whom he personally knew and the first generation after them upon attain-
ing majority”). As Hobhouse put it: 
A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events 
which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know and see. 
Within the former province we may push his natural affections and his capac-
ity of judgment to make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to 
make for him. Within the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wis-
est judgment is constantly baffled by the course of events. 
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The Rule is said to have two purposes: (1) to keep property market-
able, and (2) to limit “dead hand” control. Preventing indefinite fractur-
ing of property ownership implements the first policy. The idea is that 
ownership of land periodically will be reconstituted into fee simple be-
cause all contingent future interests in the property must vest or fail 
within the perpetuities period.  
The dead-hand rationale for the Rule is best understood in light of 
the disagreeable consequences that can arise from unanticipated cir-
cumstances.21 The Rule implements this anti-dead-hand policy by curb-
ing future interests that, after some period of time and change in cir-
cumstances, tie up the property in potentially disadvantageous 
arrangements. As Brian Simpson explains, “given that one can, to a 
limited extent only, foresee the future and the problems it will generate, 
landowners should not be allowed to tie up lands for periods outside the 
range of reasonable foresight.”22 Forever is a long time. 
Measured against these two purposes, the Rule is both under- and 
overinclusive. The Rule is underinclusive because it only applies to 
contingent interests, but vested interests can also compromise the 
Rule’s underlying policy objectives.23 It is overinclusive because if the 
trustee is given the power to sell the trust property and reinvest the pro-
ceeds, as is typical,24 there is no concern with marketability.25 Nonethe-
less, the prevailing academic view is that the Rule “does, by and large, 
effectively prevent tying up property for an inordinate length of time.”26 
Under the orthodox Rule’s possibilities test, even the most implau-
sible assumption about what might happen will render a contingent fu-
ture interest invalid. Hence the casebooks are replete with improbable 
 
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 188, 183-185 (photo. reprint (1880)).   
21. Compare T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commis-
sion’s Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284 (2000), with ENGLISH LAW 
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 5, 8, 20, and LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE 
DEAD HAND 58-59 (1955). 
22. A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 159-60 (1987).  
Simpson continues: “The good patriarch looks into the future, but not too long. . . . 
The compromise which English law adopted was to allow property to be tied up for 
the lifetime of someone in existence at the time of the settlement and a reasonable 
period thereafter—for example, a minority.” Id.   
23. The clearest example is a vested interest that will “take ages to become pos-
sessory.” T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
513, 559-60 (2003).  
24. The modern trustee’s default powers are broad.  See UNIFORM TRUST CODE 
§§815-16 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §85 (T.D. No. 4, 2005); 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 777-78; John H. Langbein, The Contractarian 
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 640-43 (1995). 
25. See SIMES, supra note 22, at 40-42. Although the Rule began as a device to 
curb tying up land, it was eventually extended to personal property. Today, because 
almost all life estates and future interests are created in trust rather than as legal in-
terests, the Rule’s primary modern application is to interests in trusts funded with 
stocks, bonds, and other liquid financial assets.  
26. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 675. 
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scenarios involving bizarre occurances such as childbearing octogenari-
ans and toddlers, unborn widows, inexhaustible gravel pits, wars that 
never end, slothful executors, and explosive birthday presents.27 The 
unborn widow scenario is illustrative. Thus: 
 
 Case 1. “The Unborn Widow.” T bequeaths a fund in trust to H 
for life, then to H’s widow for life, then the remainder to H’s sur-
viving descendants.  Even if H is married to W1 at T’s death, the 
marriage might end and then H could marry W2, who might not 
have been born before T’s death. In such a case, the remainder to 
H’s descendants will not vest until the death of W2, which could 
happen more than twenty-one years  after the death of all lives in 
being at the time of T’s death.   
 
Such cases, plus the many booby traps that lie hidden in the Rule’s 
intricacies, brought the common law Rule—but not its underlying 
policy against remote vesting—into disrepute. 
Begininng in the 1950s, dissatisfaction with the Rule’s exasperat-
ing complexities and absurd assumptions led to reform to stay what 
Barton Leach famously called “the slaughter of the innocents” in the 
Rule’s “reign of terror.”28 Some states enacted statutory fixes for spe-
cific fantasy scenarios, in particular the unborn widow and the fertile 
octogenarian. Other states authorized the courts to reform instruments 
that otherwise would have been void ab initio. Still other states 
adopted the so-called wait-and-see principle whereby courts wait to 
see if, in light of actual instead of possible events, the interest will in 
fact vest or fail within a specified period. The culmination of this re-
form movement was the 1986 Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpe-
tuities (USRAP). USRAP, some form of which is now in force in 
about half the states, provides a wait-and-see period of ninety years 
and authorizes reformation of instruments that would otherwise vio-
late the Rule. 
These reforms were not without controversy. On the contrary, the 
 
27. See ELIAS CLARK ET AL., GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 753-69; JOEL C. DOBRIS 
ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS 839-48 (2d ed. 2003); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 
4, at 678-86; JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 306-11 (5th ed. 
2002); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES 457 (3d ed. 2004); EUGENE SCOLES ET AL., DECEDENT’S ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS 1075-78 (6th ed. 2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 608-09 
(3d ed. 2002); VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ES-
TATES 982-85 (2003); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 
1206-18 (3d ed. 2002. 
28. See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s Reign 
of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the 
Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REV. 35 (1952).  
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debate “came to resemble a holy war.”29 Leach’s advocacy of wait-
and-see in the 1950s prompted a wave of forceful opposition led by 
Michigan’s Lewis Simes.30 When Leach’s Harvard colleague James 
Casner proposed writing wait-and-see into the Restatement (Second) 
of Property in the late 1970s, Professor Richard Powell, then almost 
ninety, came out of retirement to join with his Columbia colleagues 
Curtis Berger and Louis Lusky to speak against doing so. In 1986, 
with the promulgation of USRAP, still another epic battle broke out, 
this time between UCLA’s Jesse Dukeminier and Michigan’s Law-
rence Waggoner, USRAP’s principal drafter.31 
Both the existence and the ferociousness of those debates have 
relevance to the present study for two reasons. First, they bring into 
sharp relief the abruptness of abolishing the Rule altogether. The 
prior debates focused on reforming the Rule, not abandoning it. Abo-
lition represents a stark departure from a longstanding principle of 
Anglo-American common law. Yet there has been little or no debate 
on the merits of the Rule in the state legislatures that have abolished 
it.32 By documenting the impact of abolishing the Rule, we hope that 
 
29. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1306; see also Susan F. French, Per-
petuities: Three Essays in Honor of My Father, 65 WASH. L. REV. 323, 332-34 
(1990) (describing the “Perpetuities Wars”).  
30.  See Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The “Wait 
and See” Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 184-190 (1953). Leach responded to 
Simes and other critics of wait-and-see in W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legisla-
tion: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960). For a comprehensive 
bibliography on perpetuities reform, see 10 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 75A.07 
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000). There exists no precise count of the trees sacri-
ficed to the perpetuities wars. 
31. The Dukeminier/Waggoner debate centered on the mechanics for measuring 
the wait-and-see period. Waggoner supported USRAP’s ninety-year period. Duke-
minier favored using lives causally related to vesting and argued that adoption of 
USRAP’s ninety year period would lead eventually to the Rule’s demise. See Law-
rence W. Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718 (1983); 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1648-1747 (1985) (comprising five articles); Jesse Duke-
minier, Wait-and-See: The Causal Relationship Principle, 102 L.Q. REV. 250 
(1986); Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety 
Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Limbo]; 
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The 
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988). For per-
spectives on USRAP by persons other than Dukeminier and Waggoner, see Ira Mark 
Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23 
(1987); Mary Louise Fellows, Testing Perpetuity Reforms: A Study of Perpetuity 
Cases 1984-89, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 597 (1991); Amy Morris Hess, Freeing 
Property Owners from the RAP Trap: Tennessee Adopts the Uniform Statutory Rule 
Against Perpetuities, 62 TENN. L. REV. 267 (1995); Ronald C. Link & Kimberly A. 
Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Statutory Rule Against 
Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1783 
(1996); see also Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and Socially Effective 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C.L. REV. 545 (1988) (proposing a rule of trust du-
ration of 120 years). 
32.  Dukeminier and Krier make this point strongly: “[The] absence of interest 
in perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax gives rise to the troubling likelihood that the 
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this Essay will facilitate a reasoned public policy discourse informed 
by empirical realities. 
Second, our analysis may throw light on a significant point of 
dispute between Waggoner and Dukeminier. Dukeminier argued that 
lawyers might use USRAP’s ninety-year wait-and-see period as a 
planning device, employing ninety-year trusts instead of designing 
more tailored trusts using special powers of appointment and the 
like.33 We therefore test whether a state’s adoption of USRAP at-
tracted trust assets to the state. This is an imperfect assessment of 
Dukeminier’s prediction, however, because in the period under study 
perpetual trusts became widely available. Whatever the advantages of 
a ninety-year trust, a perpetual trust offers more. 
Another reason to suppose that a state’s enactment of USRAP 
would not attract trust assets is the prior emergence of the perpetui-
ties saving clause. A saving clause ensures that an overlooked viola-
tion of the Rule will not render the trust invalid.34 As a result, even in 
a jurisdiction that has retained the common law Rule, the state of the 
art in drafting makes it easy to establish a trust that will endure for a 
century, if not longer,35 and inclusion of a perpetuities saving clause 
 
Rule Against Perpetuities is being abolished with little if any reflection upon the 
merits of the Rule on its own, without regard to tax considerations.” Dukeminier & 
Krier, supra note 8, at 1317. There is, however, a considerable scholarly literature 
on the race to abolish the Rule. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail Is Kill-
ing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569 (2000); Verner F. Chaffin, 
Georgia’s Proposed Dynasty Trust: Giving the Dead Too Much Control, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 1 (2000); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or The 
RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Duke-
minier & Krier, supra note 8; Stephen E. Greer, The Alaska Dynasty Trust, 18 
ALASKA L. REV. 253 (2001); Rakowski, supra note 9; Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional 
Competition to Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2097, 2103-04 (2003); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the 
Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595 (2005); Angela M. Vallario, Death by a 
Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141 (1999). 
33. See Dukeminier, Limbo, supra note 31, at 1039-41; Jesse Dukeminier, The 
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: New Perils for 
Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 207-09 
(1995) [hereinafter Dukeminier, Perils]; Jesse Dukeminier, Dynasty Trusts: Shel-
tering Descendants From Transfer Taxes, 23 EST. PLAN. 417, 420-21 (1996); JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 852 (6th ed. 
2000); see also DOBRIS ET AL., supra note 27, at 895 (suggesting that USRAP “is 
likely to become a planning doctrine”).   
34. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 695-96; WAGGONER ET AL., supra 
note 27, at 1218-27; DAVID M. BECKER, PERPETUITIES AND ESTATE PLANNING 
133-184 (1993). 
35. See PENNELL, supra note 14, at 18-26. Although probably not used in prac-
tice, see WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1222-23, the idea of a “twelve-healthy-
babies clause” has captured the academic imagination:  
[A] settlor, when motivated by vanity, is able to tie up his property, regardless of 
lives and deaths in his family, for . . . twenty-one years after the deaths of a dozen 
or so healthy babies chosen from families noted for longevity, a term which, in 
the ordinary course of events, will add up to about a century.  
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is cheaper and easier than going out of state. Indeed, avoiding a per-
petuities violation by inclusion of a saving clause is so simple that, 
contrary to a pernicious leading case, drafting an instrument that vio-
lates the Rule is almost certainly malpractice.36 
Until the recent movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, the unifying theme of perpetuities reform in the twentieth cen-
tury was continuing respect for the long-standing policy against re-
mote vesting. Even in its reformed versions and buffered by saving 
clauses, the Rule requires that contingent interests vest or fail within a 
specified period. For this reason, prior to its widespread abolition, the 
Rule continued to represent a practical constraint on trust duration.37 
B. Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes38 
Since the nineteenth century Congress has levied taxes on gratui-
tous wealth transfers in the form of death and inter vivos gift taxes. 
Death taxes comprise both estate and inheritance taxes; the two are 
not synonymous. An estate tax is imposed on the decedent’s estate 
(the transferor). An inheritance tax is imposed on the beneficiaries 
(the transferees). 
Congress first levied an inheritance tax to help fund the Civil War 
and then again in the 1890s to fund the war with Spain.39 During 
World War I, Congress turned to an estate tax, which it has continued 
to levy ever since. Prior to 1986, however, the estate tax could be 
avoided by using successive life interests.40 Because a life tenancy 
 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.16, at 52 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). The Eng-
lish counterpart is the “royal lives clause,” which provides that the trust is to continue 
until twenty-one years after the death of all the living descendants of Queen Victoria or 
of some other British monarch. See ENGLISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 10, at 97-98. 
36. In Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), the court held that the atypi-
cal violation of the Rule at issue in that case did not amount to malpractice. In view 
of the development of saving clauses, however, Lucas is almost certainly no longer 
good law. See Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 n.2 (Ct. App. 1975); JO-
SEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 7.7.4, at 333 (2d ed. 2005). 
37. Becauset the Rule prohibits vesting outside of the applicable perpetuities pe-
riod, the identity of all persons with a claim to the underlying property will be as-
certained within that time. Once all the beneficiaries are ascertained, they can ter-
minate the trust when the perpetuities period expires. The settlor cannot prevent 
this. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 (1981); 
1A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS § 62.10, at 336 (4th ed. 1987). If the beneficiaries do not terminate the 
trust, the trust corpus will be distributed to the principal beneficiaries when the pre-
ceding life estates expire. 
38. Portions of this section draw on DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 845-
49, 919-22. 
39. For an excellent history of federal estate and inheritance taxes, see Louis 
Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223 (1956). 
40. See REGIS W. CAMPFIELD ET AL., TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS, AND 
TRUSTS 722-24 (22d ed. 2002); JEFFREY N. PENNELL, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER 
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terminates at death and the estate tax applies only to the decedent’s 
transferable interests, there is no tax on the death of a life tenant. 
Thus: 
 
Case 2. The Successive Life Estates Loophole. O creates a trust for 
the benefit of her daughter A for life, and then to A’s daughter B for 
life (O’s grandchild), with the remainder to B’s children (O’s great-
grandchildren). Although O may have to pay a gift or estate tax 
upon the trust’s creation, no estate tax will be levied at the death of 
A or B. Not until the death of B’s children—O’s great-
grandchildren—will another estate tax be due. 
 
Congress sought to close the successive-life-estate loophole with 
the generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax under the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986.41 In rough terms, a transfer to a grandchild, great-grandchild, 
or any other person who is two or more generations below the trans-
feror is a generation-skipping transfer; the GST tax is assessed on 
generation-skipping transfers.42  Hence, in Case 2, a GST tax would 
be payable at the death of A and at the death of B.  The GST tax rate 
equals the highest rate of the estate tax, currently 47%.43  
Under the 1986 Act, however, each transferor has a lifetime ex-
emption from the GST tax, originally $1 million and now $1.5 mil-
lion, which is scheduled to grow incrementally to $3.5 million by 
2009.44 Accordingly, a transferor can fund a trust with the amount of 
the exemption, free of GST tax, which will endure as long as state 
perpetuities law permits. Crucially, the federal tax code puts no limit 
on the duration of the GST tax exemption. Instead, Congress left it to 
state perpetuities law to limit the duration of a GST-tax-exempt 
trust.45 Thus: 
 
TAXATION 981-83 (4th ed. 2003). 
41. The GST tax provisions comprise Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (2000). Congress attempted to close the successive-life-estates 
loophole in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, but the 1976 scheme was later repealed 
retroactively. See PENNELL, supra note 40, at 981-88; WILLBANKS, supra note 1, § 
15.01, at 220. 
42. See I.R.C. § 2651 (defining generational assignments); id. § 2613 (defining 
skip and non-skip persons); id. § 2611 (defining generation-skipping transfer); id. § 
2612 (defining taxable events); see also PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL 
WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 713-16 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing generation-
skipping transfers); BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXA-
TION 562-67 (9th ed. 2005) (same). 
43. The maximum rates are as follows: 49% in 2003; 48% in 2004; 47% in 
2005; 46% in 2006; and 45% in 2007-09. I.R.C. §§ 2641, 2001.  
44. The exemption schedule is as follows: through 2003, $1,000,000; in 2004 
and 2005, $1,500,000; in 2006 through 2008, $2,000,000; and in 2009, $3,500,000. 
I.R.C. §§ 2631(c), 2010(c). 
45. “When Congress originally enacted a tax on generation-skipping transfers, 
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Case 3. The GST-Tax-Exempt Trust. O funds a trust with $1.5 mil-
lion that is to pay income to O’s daughter A for life. A is given a 
special power to appoint the trust corpus [outright or] in further 
trust to O’s descendants or the spouses of such descendants.46 At 
A’s death, A exercises her power over the trust corpus by appointing 
it in her will to her children B and C in equal shares and in further 
trust, giving each a similar special power over the share of each, 
and so on. Although O may have had to pay some gift or estate tax 
upon creating the trust, no estate, gift, or GST tax will be due on the 
exercise of A’s, B’s, or C’s special power or the exercise of any 
other subsequent special power for so long as state perpetuities law 
permits.47 
 
Accordingly, in 1986 state perpetuities law became an obviously 
critical factor in estate planning. The longer the trust in Case 3 could 
be extended, the more generations could benefit from the trust fund 
free of transfer taxes. 
For at least two reasons the $1.5 million (or even $3.5 million) 
figure understates the potential value of this loophole. First, subse-
quent appreciation in the value of the trust is likewise exempt from 
transfer taxation for as long as the trust may endure under state perpe-
tuities law. Thus estate planners recommend funding the trust with 
assets that are likely to experience significant appreciation.48 Second, 
the transfer tax rates are quite high, presently the maximum rate is 
47%. Thus, if the trust were subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
the fund would be halved at the death of each successive generation 
at the conclusion of the perpetuities period.49 
 
it noted that ‘[m]ost States have a rule against perpetuities which limits the duration 
of a trust.’” JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 394. 
46. Property subject to a special power, as compared to a general power, is not 
treated as belonging to the holder of the power for tax purposes. The difference is 
that the holder of a special power (sometimes also called a limited or non-general 
power) may not exercise it in favor of the holder’s creditors, the holder’s estate, or 
the creditors of the holder’s estate. I.R.C. § 2041. Special powers can thus be used 
to preserve much of the flexibility of ownership without incurring the tax liability 
of ownership. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 596. However, to avoid the 
risk that the power might be deemed a general power if the beneficiary could ap-
point the property outright to a minor child, a well-drafted trust would prohibit the 
beneficiary from using the power to satisfy any obligation to support or educate any 
person. On the policy significance of the language in brackets, see text accompany-
ying infra notes 147-148.  
47. On the application of the Rule to powers of appointment, see DUKEMINIER 
ET AL., supra note 4, at 690-95; and WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 27, at 1262-74. 
48. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 8, at 1318-19; Pierce H. McDowell, 
III, Trust Forum Shopping: The Next Generation, TR. & EST., Aug. 1997, at 10, 10-
11.  
49. Although we are dubious of his underlying assumptions, in a recent book 
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The foregoing remains the state of the law today, even after the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EG-
TRRA).50 
C. The Race to Abolish the RAP 
For reasons unrelated to the GST tax, Idaho, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin had already abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities before 
1986. But as we show below and in greater detail elsewhere,51 these 
states experienced little to no resulting advantage in the jurisdictional 
competition for trust funds prior to 1986. Then came the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. As the practicing bar digested the Act and grasped the 
nature of the GST tax, it became apparent that making use of the 
transferor’s exemption in a perpetual trust had significant long-term 
tax advantages.52 If the trust in Case 3, above, were created in Idaho, 
South Dakota, or Wisconsin, it could continue, free from federal 
wealth transfer taxation, generation after generation, forever. 
As a general matter, prior to 1986 there was little significant 
variation in trust law across the states.53 After the GST tax, however, 
 
Richard Nenno captures the magic of compound growth in the absence of a transfer 
tax at each generation. Assuming 5% after-tax growth and a GST tax that would be 
levied every twenty-five years, a transfer-tax-exempt perpetual dynasty trust funded 
initially with $1 million would be worth $131,501,258 after 100 years. This com-
pares with $10,376,082 for an initial $1 million investment without perpetual trans-
fer-tax-exempt status. See RICHARD W. NENNO, DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUSTS, TO-
TAL RETURN TRUSTS, AND ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 176-77 (2005).  
50. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 38 (2001). EGTRRA 
repeals the GST tax and the estate tax (but not the gift tax) as to transfers that take 
place in 2010. EGTRRA also reduces somewhat the marginal tax rates while in-
creasing the lifetime exemption in the years before 2010. See supra notes 43-44. 
But for transfers occurring in 2011 and beyond, it reinstates both the GST tax and 
the estate tax at their 2001 levels. Accordingly, unless one is certain that one will 
die in 2010, both the GST tax and the estate tax remain highly relevant considera-
tions in estate planning. See, e.g., Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer 
Taxes, 58 TAX L. 93, 107-16 (2004) (hereinafter Report on Reform). On the politi-
cal economy of EGTRRA and the estate tax repeal movement, see MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING 
INHERITED WEALTH (2005); see also David G. Duff, The Abolition of Wealth 
Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Univ. of To-
ronto Leg. Stud. Res. Pap. No. 05-08, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719744.  
51. See text accompanying infra notes 117-119;Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra 
note 12. 
52. To put the learning difficulties into perspective, consider that USRAP was 
amended in 1990—four years after its promulgation and the enactment of the GST 
tax, both in 1986—because of a potential tax problem (irrelevant for this Essay) 
arising from the interaction of the two. See USRAP §1(e); Dukeminier, Perils, su-
pra note 33, at 187-94. 
53. State courts regularly cited the same leading authorities, namely, the 1959 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts and the current versions of the Scott and Bogert 
treatises.  See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code: Codification of the Law 
of Trusts in the United States, 15 Tr. L. Int’l 66, 67 & n.3 (2001) (noting the perva-
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state perpetuities law became increasingly differentiated. Inasmuch as 
South Dakota does not levy a tax on trust income, but Idaho does and 
Wisconsin did until recently, South Dakota became a premier trust 
fund situs once the bar figured out the perpetuities loophole in the 
GST tax. Given prevailing choice-of-law principles54 and the shift in 
the nature of wealth from land to financial assets (making trust assets 
portable),55 it was only a matter of time until jurisdictional competi-
tion sparked a race to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
To ensure that the law of state B will govern the validity and ad-
ministration of a trust created by a settlor who resides in state A, law-
yers usually advise the settlor not only to provide in the trust instru-
ment that the law of state B is to govern, but also to name a trustee 
located in state B and to give that trustee custody of the trust fund. As 
a result, an out-of-state settlor who wants to invoke the law of state B 
will typically appoint as trustee a bank or trust company located in 
state B. Therein lies the payoff to state B and the political economy of 
the RAP’s demise. Ever since South Dakota’s advantage was under-
stood, abolition of the RAP has been “pushed by banking associa-
tions . . . [that] wish to remain competitive with banks where perpet-
ual trusts are permitted.”56 Joel Dobris puts it more bluntly: “When 
the bankers want something, they get it.”57 
To be sure, the statutory law of South Dakota and the other aboli-
tion states does not expressly require naming an in-state trustee as a 
predicate to creating a perpetual trust. But the settlor is well advised 
to do so in order to provide a nexus with the state whose law is being 
invoked. Such a nexus increases the odds that another state’s courts 
will respect the settlor’s choice-of-law provision.58 Further, several of 
 
sive influence of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, “which has long been the 
most authoritative source for American trust law”). 
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§270, 272 (1971). 
55. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth 
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988). 
56. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 854; see also Rachel Wolcott, 
New Jersey Poised to Allow Dynasty Trusts, PRIVATE ASSET MANAGEMENT, May 
17, 1999, at 1 (stating that the New Jersey legislation, which was “sponsored by the 
New Jersey Bankers Association, was drawn up so that New Jersey trust institu-
tions could avoid losing potential dynasty trust business and other types of trust 
business to Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska”); A. 2804, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1999) 
(stating that the purpose of repeal was “to permit banks and trust companies to of-
fer ‘dynasty trusts’ to their customers, such as those that are being offered by banks 
and trust companies located in other states”).  
57. Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New 
Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 
543, 572 (1998). 
58. See 1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ES-
TATE PLANNING § 17.01[F], at 1166-69 (2d ed. 1999); Sterk, supra note 32, at 
2101-04 (2003). We say increases the odds because as yet there is no definitive 
caselaw. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Reaching for the Sky—or Pie in the Sky: Is 
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the abolition states have enacted statutes that provide that the ap-
pointment of an in-state trustee, while not necessary, is sufficient to 
ensure jurisdiction in that state’s courts and the applicability of that 
state’s law.59  
We do not claim that there are no transaction costs in moving fi-
nancial assets to another state or that it is not simpler to name as trus-
tee a local bank rather than an out-of-state bank. But for wealthy do-
nors these costs and inconveniences may be worthwhile given the 
transfer tax savings—roughly fifty cents on the dollar—available to 
subsequent generations if the trust can endure in perpetuity. As Stew-
art Sterk explains, naming an out-of-state “institution as trustee repre-
sents an insignificant constraint. Capital is extraordinarily mobile, so 
whether the trust property constitutes securities or cash, it will make 
little difference to the settlor whether legal title is held by” a local or 
an out-of-state bank.60 
For a variety of historical reasons, Delaware—the hegemon of 
corporate regulatory competition—has long been a trust-friendly ju-
risdiction and by 1986 had a disproportionate share of the nation’s 
trust funds.61 Indeed, prior to the GST tax, on several occasions 
Delaware tweaked its perpetuities law to create tax and other advan-
tages to settling a trust in Delaware.62 So it was hardly a surprise 
 
U.S. Onshore Trust Reform an Illusion?, in EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
TRUSTS AND OTHER RING-FENCED FUNDS 291, 297-302 (David Hayton ed., 2002). 
59. See, e.g., ALASKA CODE § 13.36.035 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2131.09(B)(2)(b) (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-1-2 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
55-3-39 (Michie 2001); see also ALASKA CODE § 13.36.043 (2004) (providing for 
change of situs to Alaska). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and 
Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999 (1994) (examining use of 
choice-of-law statutes to facilitate jurisdictional competition). 
60. Sterk, supra note 32, at 2104.  
61. In regressions reported in a forthcoming study using state-level panel data 
from 1969 through 1984, we find that Delaware’s aggregate trust business in that 
time period greatly exceeded that which would be predicted based on its population 
and income. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12. Thus, in 1986 Delaware’s 
share of all trust funds held by federally reporting trustees was eight times larger 
than its share of the population (2% versus 0.25%). To make these figures less ab-
stract, consider that in 1986, when New York institutional trustees held $3,500 in 
trust assets per state resident, Delaware institutional trustees held $12,600 in trust 
assets per state resident. Delaware’s dominant position is also apparent in infra 
Figure 2. 
62. In 1986 Delaware established a 110-year perpetuities period for property 
held in trust. Delaware had earlier enacted a statute which provided that a new per-
petuities period would begin on the exercise of a power of appointment. See Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 25, § 501 (1989). Hence Delaware made possible a perpetual trust 
long before 1995. However, Congress effectively foreclosed this option with I.R.C. 
§ 2041(a)(3), which makes the extension of the perpetuities period under § 501 a 
taxable event for all trusts created in or after 1942. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & 
Jeffrey N. Pennell, Adventures in Generation-Skipping, or How We Learned to Love 
the “Delaware Tax Trap,” 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75 (1989); DUKEMINIER ET 
AL., supra note 4, at 694-95. 
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when in 1995 Delaware became the first state after the enactment of 
the GST tax to abolish the Rule as applied to interests in trust.63 The 
bill’s official synopsis makes its purpose plain: 
Several states, including Idaho, Wisconsin and South Dakota, 
have abolished altogether their rules against perpetuities, 
which has given those jurisdictions a competitive advantage 
over Delaware in attracting assets held in trusts created for es-
tate planning purposes.... 
The multi-million dollar capital commitments to these irrevo-
cable trusts, and the ensuing compound growth over decades, 
will result in the formation of a substantial capital base in the 
innovative jurisdictions that have abolished the rule against 
perpetuities. Several financial institutions have now organized 
or acquired trust companies, particularly in South Dakota, at 
least in part to take advantage of their favorable trust law. 
Delaware’s repeal of the rule against perpetuities for personal 
property held in trust will demonstrate Delaware’s continued 
vigilance in maintaining its role as a leading jurisdiction for 
the formation of capital and the conduct of trust business.64  
The Delaware statute triggered a race to abolish the Rule. Be-
tween 1997 and 2000, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
New Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island authorized perpetual trusts. By 
year end 2004, Colorado, Florida (360 years), Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, Utah (1,000 years), Virgina, and Wyoming (1,000 
years) had followed suit. In 2005 Nevada extended its perpetuities 
period to 365 years.65 Legislation designed to abolish the Rule 
Against Perpetuities is under consideration in several other states.66 
The following maps illustrate the spread of the Rule’s abolition. 
The first illustrates the extent of the Rule at the time the GST tax was 
enacted; the second shows the extent of the Rule in 1995, when 
Delaware acted; and the final two maps, which present the extent of 
the Rule at year end 1998 and 2004, show the increasingly rapid pace 
of the Rule’s abolition. 
[ME: Insert first four maps here] 
Before moving on, it is necessary to acknowledge some doctrinal 
nuances that we gloss over when we speak of the Rule’s abolition. 
 
63. See 70 Del. Laws 164 (1995). 
64. H.B. 245, 138th Gen. Assemb., (Del. 1995).  
65. See 2005 Nev. Laws Ch. 270 (S.B. 64) (effective October 1, 2005). This 
legislation supersedes an earlier 2005 enactment extending the perpetuities period 
to 150 years. See 2005 Nev. Laws Ch. 163 (S.B. 382).  
66. See Tate, supra note 32, at 604 n.45 (collecting pending legislation).  
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Some states have abolished the Rule altogether. Some states have 
abolished it as applied to interests in trust if the trustee has the power 
to sell the trust assets and then reinvest the proceeds (in the technical 
jargon, as applied to trusts that do not suspend the power of alien-
ation). Some states have abolished the Rule as applied to interests in 
personal property. Some have established such lengthy perpetuities 
periods (360 or even 1,000 years) that in those states the Rule is 
barely recognizable. In still others, the Rule, which had always been 
construed as a mandatory rule to curtail the dead hand,67 has been 
changed to a default rule that applies unless the settlor provides oth-
erwise. 
The subtle distinctions among these approaches have been care-
fully parsed elsewhere.68 For the purpose of this study, all that mat-
ters is whether the state’s perpetuities law permits a perpetual trust. If 
the answer is yes, we count the state as having abolished the Rule. 
Our coding is detailed in Table 5. 
D. Additional Margins of Competition 
In general, there is little variation in the basic law of trusts across 
the states.69 Moreover, the law of trusts is comprised largely of de-
fault rules that may be varied by the settlor.70 Accordingly, apart 
from state perpetuities law, in the usual case there is little reason to 
 
67. Gray expressed this view in stronger language: 
The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construction, but a peremptory 
command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a test, more or less artificial, 
to determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention. Therefore every provision 
in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the Rule did not exist, and then to 
the provision so construed the Rule is to be remorselessly applied.  
Gray, supra note 19, at § 629. On the oddity of transmogrifying rules of law into 
rules of construction, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 16.3 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004). 
68. See Garrett Moritz, Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2588, 2590-95 (2003); Tate, supra note 32, at 603 n.44. Readers 
familiar with the more arcane features of property law might ask about the rule 
against accumulations of income. In Delaware, Illinois, and South Dakota, which 
are among the most aggressive of the perpetual trust states, the legislatures have 
dealt with this question expressly. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 25, § 506 (Supp. 2004); 
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1 (2001); 1998 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ch. 282, § 27 (Michie 
1998). True, in states without legislative action, the law is less clear. But the common 
law accumulations period is the same as the perpetuities period. See Robert H. Sit-
koff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006). Thus, if the perpetuities period with respect to a particular trust is 
extended by repeal of the Rule, then the permissible accumulations period should be 
likewise extended. See id.[ 
69. See supra note 53. 
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §4 cmt. a(1) (2003); John H. Lang-
bein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Robert 
H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 642-
43 (2004). 
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settle a trust out-of-state given the increased transaction costs of do-
ing so. 
In this section we explore the two primary exceptions to the fore-
going proposition, both of which involve mandatory rules (so that 
switching states is the only means of obtaining choice on these mat-
ters): (1) statutory validation of self-settled asset protection trusts, 
and (2) state fiduciary income taxes.71 These are the principal addi-
 
71. This is not to say that these two factors, plus perpetuities law, exhaust the 
entire universe of rationales for choosing to settle a trust out-of-state in a particular 
case. However, based on a review of the scholarly and practitioner literature, as 
well as a series of interviews with lawyers and trust company officers, we are con-
fident that these factors represent the only other motivations that are possibly of the 
same order of magnitude as the Rule Against Perpetuities. See, e.g., John A. War-
nick & Sergio Pareja, Selecting a Trust Situs in the 21st Century, PROB. & PROP. 53 
Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 53 (identifying perpetuities, asset protection, and state income 
taxes as the main considerations). In view of the size of total trust assets held by 
federally reporting institutional fiduciaries, phenomena that do not measure in the 
billions will not impact our analysis—and we are confident that we have not missed 
any billion-dollar phenomena. Even so, for the sake of completeness we note here 
the two most plausible additional considerations: 
 (1) Some readers might assume that the existence of a state death tax in the 
form of an estate or inheritance tax in excess of the credit formerly allowed against 
the federal estate tax could impact trust fund location. See I.R.C. § 2058 (Supp. 
2005); Jeffrey A. Cooper et al., State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day’s 
Journey Into Night, 17 QUINN. PROB. L.J. 317 (2004); Report on Reform, supra 
note 50, at 103-07. However, with respect to intangible personal property, which is 
to say stocks, bonds, and other financial assets (the stuff of modern trust funds), by 
statute or interstate agreement state death taxes are typically levied by domicile of 
the decedent, not by location of the trust fund. See 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & 
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 21.09, at 21-47 (3d ed. 2003); 2 
SCHOENBLUM, supra note 58, § 19.04, at 29-30.. Escape from state death taxes thus 
requires changing one’s domicile, a subject on which there is a separate empirical 
literature. See, e.g., JON BAKIJA & JOEL SLEMROD, DO THE RICH FLEE FROM HIGH 
STATE TAXES? EVIDENCE FROM FEDERAL ESTATE TAX RETURNS (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10645, 2004); Karen Smith Conway & Jona-
than C. Rork, Diagnosis Murder: The Death of State Death Taxes, 42 ECON. IN-
QUIRY 537 (2004). Moreover, in unreported regressions in which we coded states 
that levy an estate or inheritance tax in excess of the federal credit as YES and the 
others as NO, we found no significant correlation between a change from YES to 
NO and reported trust assets. 
 (2) Some readers might suppose that unitrust statutes will impact trust fund lo-
cation. In a unitrust the settlor sets a percentage of the value of the trust corpus to 
be paid each year to the income beneficiary, thereby allowing the trustee to invest 
for total return by freeing her from arbitrary income and principal classifications. 
See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 829. Although statutory recognition is not 
necessary to create an enforceable unitrust under state law, a state statute is neces-
sary to convert an existing principal and income trust into a unitrust, and for all uni-
trusts a state statute is all but mandatory for a host of federal tax reasons. See Adam 
J. Wiensch & L. Elizabeth Beetz, The Liberation of Total Return, TR. & EST., Apr. 
2004, at 44; Robert B. Wolf & Stephan R. Leimberg, Total Return Trusts Approved 
by New Regs. But State Law is Crucial, 31 EST. PLAN. 179 (2004). On this view, 
the presence of a unitrust statute might be a reason to locate a trust in one state ver-
sus another. However, the earliest statute was enacted by Delaware in 2001, and 
most were enacted in later years. The phenomenon is thus too recent to be reflected 
in our data. Given our coding scheme of recording the year after adoption as the 
year of the legal change, this would give only a handful of state-year observations. 
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tional margins, beyond perpetuities law, on which the states compete 
for trust funds. Because several states changed their law on one or 
both of these issues in the period under study, it is necessary to con-
trol for these factors in assessing the impact of the abolition of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities. A brief treatment of each yields additional 
testable hypotheses. 
1. Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts72 
A longstanding principle of trust law holds that the settlor cannot 
shield assets from creditors by placing them in a trust for his or her 
own benefit. Even if the trust is discretionary, spendthrift, or both, the 
settlor’s creditors can reach the maximum amount that the trustee can 
pay the settlor or apply for the settlor’s benefit.73 Thus: 
 
Case 4. Self-Settled Trust. O, a surgeon, transfers property to X in 
trust to pay so much of the income and principal to O as X deter-
mines in X’s sole and absolute discretion. Five years later, O botches 
a routine surgery, causing grievous injury to the patient, A. A may 
enforce an award of damages against the entire corpus of the trust, 
because X could, in X’s discretion, pay the entire corpus to O. This 
result obtains even if the trust instrument provides that O’s interest 
may not be reached by O’s creditors (a spendthrift clause). Nor does 
it matter that O’s right to the trust assets is subject to X’s discretion. 
 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, however, several off-
shore and domestic jurisdictions enacted statutes that reverse the tra-
ditional rule, thereby giving rise to the self-settled asset protection 
trust (APT). If such a statute were applicable in Case 4, then A would 
have no recourse against the assets in the trust even if O admitted to 
botching A’s surgery and put up no defense in the malpractice suit. 
The story of the recognition of APTs begins in the sunny Carib-
bean, South Pacific, and other exotic offshore locales. In the 1980s, a 
host of such jurisdictions—including Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, 
Grenada, Isle of Man, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nevis, Sa-
moa, St. Lucia, and Turks and Caicos—amended their trust laws to 
allow the creation of a self-settled trust against which the settlor’s 
 
72. Portions of this section draw on DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 557-
60, 566-69. 
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §156 (1959). These rules are car-
ried forward in UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 505 (2000) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS §§ 58(2), 60 cmt. f (2003). 
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creditors have no recourse.74 Although it has been conjectured that 
the value of offshore APTs exceeds $1 trillion,75 no reliable empirical 
study exists. 
The APT migrated onshore in 1997 in the form of an innovative 
Alaska statute. This statute was drafted by a prominent New York trust 
lawyer, his brother (who is now the head of the Alaska Trust Com-
pany), and an Alaska lawyer. The three had the idea while on a fishing 
trip in Alaska.76 Under the Alaska statute, the settlor’s creditors have no 
recourse against the settlor’s interest in a self-settled discretionary trust 
provided that the initial transfer was not fraudulent.77 To ensure a local 
payoff, Alaska law provides that, if an Alaska resident or banking insti-
tution is designated as trustee and some of the trust assets are deposited 
with an Alaska institution, both jurisdiction in the Alaska courts and the 
applicability of Alaska law will be ensured.78 
In 1997 Delaware likewise validated APTs.79 The official synopsis 
 
74. See Denis Kleinfeld, Choosing an Offshore Jurisdiction, in ASSET PROTEC-
TION STRATEGIES: PLANNING WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 73 (Alex-
ander A. Bove, Jr. ed., 2002); Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: 
Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 62 (1994); see also 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 32-40 (1996) (discussing 
“foreign haven strategies”). The Cook Islands’ International Trusts Act of 1984, 
which is representative, validates self-settled spendthrift trusts, provided that the 
beneficiary is not a resident of the Cook Islands. International Trusts Act §5(1) (last 
amended 1999) (Cook Islands). As Sterk has observed, this qualification is “a sure 
sign that the purpose of the statute was to attract foreign capital.” Stewart E. Sterk, 
Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
1035, 1048 (2000).  
75. See 1 WALTER H. DIAMOND, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS AND 
ANALYSIS FRW-1 (2004); see also Sterk, supra note 74, at 1036 (stating that “con-
servative estimates exceed one trillion dollars”). 
76. See ALASKA TRUST CO., THE GENESIS OF THE ALASKA TRUST COMPANY, 
THE ALASKA TRUST ACT, AND OTHER UNIQUE TRUST LEGISLATION, 
http://www.alaskatrust.com/www/thegen.html; James L. Dam, New Trusts Will Of-
fer Estate Tax Breaks, Protection from Creditors, LAW. WKLY., Apr. 21, 1997, at 1 
(including a photo of one of the fish caught); Brigid McMenamin, Flimsy Shelters, 
FORBES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 94; Douglas J. Blattmachr & Jonathan G. Blattmacher, A 
New Direction in Estate Planning: North to Alaska, TR. & EST., Sept. 1997, at 48. 
Representative Al Vezey sponsored the legislation. See Hearings on H.B. 101 Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Labor and Commerce, 20th Leg. (Alaska 1997) (state-
ment of Rep. Vezey); Rose Ragsdale, Opposing Parties Join Forces to Attract 
Family Trust Industry to Alaska, ALASKA J. COMM., Aug. 14, 1997. On passage of 
the Act the local media and Alaska lawyers and bankers predicted a substantial in-
flow of trust business. See Carrie Lehman, Legislation Changes Alaska Tax, Trust 
Laws, Attracts New Investors to State, ALASKA J. COMM., Aug. 18, 1997, at 1; 
Deanna Thomas, Trust Bill Could Mean Boon, ALASKA STAR, Mar. 20, 1997, at 1; 
Katharine Fraser, With New Law, Alaska Aiming to Be Trust Capital, AM. BANKER, 
Apr. 21, 1997, at 1. 
77. ALASKA CODE § 34.40.110 (Michie 2004). 
78. Id. § 13.36.035. A subsequently enacted provision authorizes transfer of exist-
ing trusts to Alaska. Id. § 13.36.043. 
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-76 (year). The Delaware statute carves out 
an exception for support claims by children and former spouses and for claims aris-
ing from death, personal injury, or property damage that occurred before the trust 
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of the Delaware Act states that it “is similar to legislation recently en-
acted in Alaska. It is intended to maintain Delaware’s role as the most 
favored domestic jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.”80 Since 
then, Nevada (1999), Rhode Island (1999), Oklahoma (2004), and Utah 
(2004) have passed statutes authorizing some form of APT, bringing 
the domestic count to six.81 
 
[ME: Insert map 5 here] 
 
Similar legislation has been introduced in other states.82 Most of the 
APT statutes condition their applicability on the appointment of an in-
state trustee.83 But even if a state’s APT statute does not require naming 
an in-state trustee, a well-advised settlor will do so anyway to increase 
the odds that courts in other states will respect the trust’s choice-of-
law provision.84 
The political dynamic driving the validation of APTs is similar to 
that which drives the movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties. Local banks and lawyers, who stand to benefit from an influx of 
trust assets, are the principal interests that have supported APTs. But 
 
was settled. Id., § 3573; see also Richard W. Nenno & John E. Sullivan, III, Dela-
ware Asset Protection Trusts: Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers and Attorney Liabil-
ity, 32 EST. PLAN. 22 (2005); Nenno, supra note 49, at § 74. 
80. 71 Del. Laws 159 (1997). See Douglas J. Blattmachr & Richard W. Hom-
pesch II, Alaska vs. Delaware: Heavyweight Competition in New Trust Laws, 
PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 32 (1998); Todd Spangler, Delaware Again 1st 
in Trusts, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 29, 1997, at 1F. 
81. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (2003); OK. ST. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 10-18 
(Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-1 to18-9.2-5 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-
6-14 (Supp. 2004). Some commentators have read an older statute in Colorado to 
authorize self-settled asset protection trusts as to future creditors, see COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 38-10-111, but in dicta the Colorado Supreme Court has rejected that in-
terpretation. In re Cohen, 8 P.3d 429, 432-34 (Colo. 1999). In 1986 Missouri 
amended its statutory rules on spendthrift trusts in a manner that could be read to 
authorize APTs, see MO. STAT. § 456.080 (superseded statute), but there is some 
contrary case law and the literature tends not to regard Missouri an APT jurisdic-
tion. See Markmueller v. Case, 51 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 1995); John K. Eason, Re-
tirement Security Through Asset Protection: The Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, 
and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 174 n.54 (2004). Hence we code neither 
Colorado nor Missouri as APT jurisdictions. In 2004 Missouri adopted a nonuni-
form version of UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 505 (2000) that took effect on January 1, 
2005, see MO. STAT. § 456.5-505.3, and its drafters intended specifically to author-
ize APTs. See James G. Blase, 61 J. Mo. B. 72 (2005). Whether the new Missouri 
statute in fact authorizes APTs does not bear on this study because it took effect 
after the timeframe of our data.   
82. See, e.g., An Act to Amend the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, in Relation 
to Qualified Dispositions in Trust, Assemb. B. 2173, 226th Ann. Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2003). 
83. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3570(9) (2001); OK. ST. ANN. tit. 31, § 11 
(Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-2(8) (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-
14(10) (Supp. 2004). 
84. See text accompanying supra notes 54-60.  
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where the abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities is driven by the de-
sire of settlors to provide a transfer-tax-exempt trust for future genera-
tions, it is the settlor’s personal liability exposure that drives the APT 
market. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that, in the face of ris-
ing premiums, some doctors have opted to drop their malpractice insur-
ance altogether in favor of moving their assets into APTs (this is the 
motivation for Case 4, above).85 Indeed, the validation of APTs is 
sometimes defended on the ground that tort liability is “out of con-
trol.”86 On this account, APTs “might be reckoned as the revenge of the 
trust lawyers against the tort lawyers.”87  
It remains to be seen whether the courts of states that adhere to the 
traditional rule will respect domestic APTs.88 In spite of this uncer-
tainty, however, validation of APTs is a potentially important distin-
guishing feature in the competition for trust funds. To the extent that an 
APT gives the settlor additional settlement leverage in negotiations with 
creditors, an APT has value, although just how much is uncertain.89 
Thus, as with the abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, validation 
 
85. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Litigation Boom Spurs Efforts to Shield As-
sets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2003, at D1; Rachel Emma Silverman, So Sue Me: Doc-
tors Without Insurance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2004, at D1. 
86. Roundtable Discussion, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 779, 793-94 (1999). 
87. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 558. 
88. Although there are not yet any definitive appellate decisions involving do-
mestic APTs, there is a cautionary scholarly literature that explores bankruptcy law, 
fraudulent conveyance law, choice of law principles, federal Constitutional limits 
(such as the Contract and the Full Faith and Credit Clauses), and other doctrinal 
bases for refusing enforcement. This literature also takes on the normative policy 
question. See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore 
Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195 (2000); John K. Eason, Developing the Asset Protec-
tion Dynamic: A Legacy of Federal Concern, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 23 (2002); Ran-
dall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 
987 (1999); Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to 
Liability?, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 (2000); Sterk, supra note 32. For a 
contrary academic view, see Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ 
Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2002). There are also numerous articles by 
or for practitioners. See, e.g., John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-
Settled Trusts: How the New Delaware Trust Law Competes With Offshore Trusts, 
23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423 (1998); Melanie Leslie, Asset Protection Trusts Find a 
Home in the United States, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 2005, at S1; David G. Shaftel & 
David H. Bundy, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Created by Nonresident 
Settlors, EST. PLAN., Apr. 2005 at 17; David G. Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Domes-
tic Asset Protection Trusts and the Bankruptcy Challenge, 32 EST. PLAN. 14 
(2005).  Offshore APTs have met with considerable judicial hostility, see, e.g., In re 
Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); Federal Trade Commission v. Affordable 
Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999), though some view these cases as cau-
tionary tales on how not to draft an offshore trust. See Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Draft-
ing Offshore Trusts, TR. & EST., July 2004, at 45-46.  
89.  Eric Henzy, who represented the plaintiff in In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 
(Bkrtcy. D. Conn. 1998), explains: “In Brooks we got a judgment essentially void-
ing this offshore trust. We then settled for approximately fifty cents on the dollar, 
because the enforcement problems were so significant.” Roundtable Discussion, su-
pra note 86, at 786. 
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of APTs has the potential to attract trust funds. We code for APTs as 
summarized in Table 5.  
2. Fiduciary Income Taxes 
Suppose O, a prospective settlor who resides in state A, wants the 
law of state B to govern the administration and validity of her trust. 
As we have seen, to achieve this end O will often be advised not only 
to designate in the trust instrument that the law of state B is to gov-
ern, but also to name a bank or trust company located in state B as 
trustee.90 In doing so, a relevant concern to the settlor is whether as a 
result state B will levy a tax on the trust’s income. Such a tax is called 
a fiduciary income tax (FIT) because the fiduciary is responsible for 
filing the return and paying the tax. 
To ascertain whether differences in state FIT regimes affect the 
location of trust funds, we must first attend to the federal taxation of 
trust income, under which trusts are treated as conduit or passthrough 
entities.91 Income distributed to a beneficiary in the year it is received 
is taxable to the beneficiary, not to the trust; income that is not so dis-
tributed is taxable to the trust, not the beneficiary. Hence, from the 
perspective of minimizing federal income taxes, trust income should 
be distributed or accumulated depending on the relative applicable 
tax rates. 
In the period under study, the rates applicable to individuals were 
significantly less than those applicable to trusts.92 Indeed, as Jeffrey 
Pennell has remarked, the rates applicable to trusts “by far are the 
most onerous applicable to any taxpayer under the Code.”93 The In-
ternal Revenue Code thus creates an incentive for trust income to be 
distributed to the beneficiary in the year it is received.94  
States that levy a FIT tend to follow a similar conduit model.95 As 
a result, for many trusts state FITs are avoided in the course of avoid-
 
90. See text accompanying supra notes 54-60.  
91. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, All You Really Need to Know About Subchapter J 
You Learned from This Article, 63 MO. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998).  
92. See Sherman, supra note 91, at 5, 37-38; 1 CCH STANDARD FEDERAL TAX 
REPORTER 1987 ¶421.05 (74th ed. 1986). The current rates are stated in I.R.C. § 
1(a)-(d) for individuals and (e) for estates and trusts. 
93. PENNELL, supra note 14, at 17-2. 
94. See McGovern & Kurtz, supra note 27, at 705. Even if the trustee has dis-
cretion not to make distributions, the trustee’s duty of prudence requires reasonable 
efforts to minimize taxes. See Mark L. Ascher, The Fiduciary Duty to Minimize 
Taxes, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 663 (1985). 
95. MAX GUTIERREZ & FREDERICK R. KEYDEL, ACTEC STUDY 6: STATE 
TAXATION ON INCOME OF TRUSTS WITH MULTI-STATE CONTACTS 12 (2001); Brad-
ley E.S. Fogel, What Have You Done For Me Lately? Constitutional Limitations on 
State Taxation of Trusts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 165, 173-74 (1998). 
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ing federal income tax. We therefore hypothesize that, by itself, 
whether a state levies a FIT on trust funds attracted from out of state 
will have little to no observable affect on trust fund location.96 
Unlike an ordinary trust, however, a transfer-tax-exempt perpet-
ual trust has a different duration and purpose that might warrant ac-
cumulation of income notwithstanding the federal income tax pen-
alty. Income accumulated in a transfer-tax-exempt trust is exempt 
from subsequent wealth transfer taxation, but such income loses its 
exempt status upon distribution to a beneficiary. The federal income 
tax penalty is not trivial, but it pales in comparison to the current 47% 
top rate of the federal transfer taxes. In contrast to the income tax, 
which reduces the trust’s rate of growth, the transfer taxes eat into the 
corpus of the trust. Hence, for a transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust, it 
may be a sensible long-term strategy to incur a present income tax li-
ability to avoid a bigger future transfer tax bill. Further, unless some 
income is retained, the trust will lose value because of inflation, a 
significant consideration if the trust’s purpose is to provide a fund for 
future generations. 
Although a settlor cannot avoid the federal income tax penalty by 
switching states, she can avoid piling on state income taxes by choos-
ing a state that does not tax income in trusts attracted from out of 
state. Accordingly, we predict that the effect of the abolition of the 
Rule will be magnified in states that do not tax income in trust funds 
attracted from out of state. Once the settlor has committed to incur-
ring the costs of settling an out-of-state trust, the marginal cost of 
choosing a state that will not levy a FIT on the trust’s income is close 
to zero but the benefits are potentially significant. 
Each state has a “unique matrix of statutory rules” setting forth 
what contacts with the state will trigger FIT liability.97 Based on our 
examination of the FIT statutes of all fifty states from 1985 through 
2004, we have coded each state as YES or NO for each year pursuant 
to the following standard of relevance: Relevant FITs are those that 
would be levied on income in a trust (1) consisting entirely of finan-
cial assets (in the jargon, intangible personal property) that is (2) set-
tled by a nonresident (3) for the benefit of a nonresident. Moreover, 
such taxes are relevant only if they would be triggered even if the 
 
96. Further, the trustee may deduct state income taxes in figuring the trust’s 
federal income tax. But a deduction is not the same as a credit—a consideration 
that, for the reasons discussed in the next paragraph, is likely to be of greater sig-
nificance for a transfer-tax-exempt perpetual trust. See also Bradley E.S. Fogel, 
State Income Taxation of Trusts, PROB. & PROP. Jul.-Aug. 2005, at 39 (examining 
state taxation of accumulations in trust). 
97. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, 2004 MULTISTATE GUIDE TO ESTATE PLANNING 
11-1.  
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trust’s only contact with the state is (a) an in-state trustee, (b) in-state 
administration, or (c) in-state situs. We use this standard of relevance 
because it characterizes the paradigmatic trust fund attracted from out 
of state and our estimation strategy measures relative increases in the 
states’ reported trust assets. Settling an out-of-state trust with an out-
of-state trustee is the primary method of avoiding state FITs other 
than changing the settlor’s or the beneficiary’s state of residence. For 
the rest of this Essay, when we speak of state taxation of income in 
trusts attracted from out of state, we refer to the six conditions stated 
above. In the absence of clarifying regulations or caselaw, we re-
solved statutory ambiguity in favor of YES. 
Our FIT coding, which is consistent with the methodology of Jef-
frey Schoenblum’s annual Multistate Guide to Estate Planning,98 is 
summarized in Table 5. Crucially, there is variation across states and 
some variation across time, which allows us to test the importance of 
FITs on their own as well as their interactive effect with abolition of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
II.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATASET 
A. Data Sources 
The trust data (state-level panel data) come from annual reports 
collected by the four federal agencies charged with banking regula-
tion: (1) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (2) the Federal 
Reserve System; (3) the Office of Thrift Supervision; and (4) the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency. All banks and other financial 
institutions that are regulated by these agencies must file an annual 
report detailing their trust holdings, including total assets and number 
of accounts. Federal statutes make these filings mandatory.99 Based 
on this data, from 1968 until 2001 the Federal Financial Institutions 
Research Council published annual reports of trust holdings by regu-
lated entities, summarizing the results by state.100 Since 2001, the 
FDIC has been publishing these reports (now available online) organ-
ized by individual institution and by state.101 
 
98. See id., at tbl.11. 
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (FDIC); Id. §§ 248(a), 1844(a) (Federal Reserve System); 
Id. §§ 1464, 1725, 1730 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board); Id. §§ 161, 1817 (Of-
fice of Comptroller of the Currency). 
100. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TRUST AS-
SETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 1985-2000.  
101. An interactive website allows one to obtain new data, state by state at 
FDIC: Statistics on Depository Institutions, http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp. 
Older reports, from 1996 through 2000, may be obtained at FFIEC: Trust Institu-
tions Information, http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/index.asp.  
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The trust holdings of regulated entities are reported in categories 
entitled “Employee Benefit,” “Personal Trusts,” and “Estates.” We 
examine only “Personal Trusts,” a category that includes both private 
and charitable trusts (both testamentary and inter vivos), but that ex-
cludes commercial trusts and employee benefit plans. Prior to 1985, 
federal authorities only collected information on actively managed 
personal trusts (meaning trusts for which the regulated entity had dis-
cretionary investment authority), and neither savings-and-loan insti-
tutions nor savings banks with trust powers were required to re-
port.102 To ensure consistency we use only data from 1985 onward.103 
In some specifications, we include additional variables from 
yearly estimates of state population and personal income.104 
B. Brief Treatment of Data Limitations 
In Appendix A, we provide a treatment of the limitations of our 
data. In this section, we examine the most serious concern about the 
data, namely, whether recent bank mergers and consolidations exag-
gerated the movement in trust assets we observe.   
Effective in 1997, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994105 made it much easier for banks 
and bank holding companies to convert independently chartered 
banks in different states into branch offices of a single interstate 
bank.106 Interstate bank mergers or branch consolidations have the 
potential to bias our results because the data are collected by institu-
tion, not by state. For example, if a bank consolidated after 1997 by 
 
102. See FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TRUST 
ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS-1987, at 2 for a discussion. 
103. Most states that abolished the RAP did so beginning in the mid-1990s. 
Hence, limiting our study to the years since 1985 provides a sufficient number of 
pre-abolition observations. We also have two years of observations prior to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. We examine the data from 1969 through 1984 in a forthcom-
ing study.  See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12. 
104. Yearly state population estimates are available at Population Estimate Ar-
chives, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/. Yearly state personal income es-
timates are available at Bureau of Economic Analysis: Regional Economic Ac-
counts, http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/statelocal.htm. Income estimates are given 
quarterly. We used the estimates in the December reports because the reporting in-
stitutions reported trust assets at year end. 
105. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N (108 Stat.) 2338 (1994) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)). See Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to 
Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIS. 255, 270-72 (1995). 
106. Prior to 1997, banks could maintain interstate branches under narrow cir-
cumstances, but a study conducted by the Federal Reserve found that few banks did 
so. Susan McLaughlin, The Impact of Interstate Banking and Branching Reform: 
Evidence from the States, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, May 
1995. 
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converting its independently chartered offices in state A into a branch 
of its headquarters bank chartered in state B, then trust assets for-
merly reported as held in state A would from that point forward be 
reported as held by the headquarters bank in state B. Mergers could 
have the same effect. If a bank chartered in state A acquired a bank 
chartered in state B and then converted the acquired bank into a 
branch, the accounts formerly reported as held in state B would be 
reported as held in state A. 
Although important to consider, this limitation does not present a 
significant impediment to our study. For mergers to bias our results 
upward (that is, to produce a falsely positive finding), a bank in an 
abolition state would have to acquire a bank in a RAP state and then 
report the acquired bank’s trust assets as held in the abolition state. 
Using a list of all bank mergers since 1991 in which the acquired 
bank had total assets over $20 billion,107 we identified only one 
merger of a bank from a RAP state into an abolition state—the 1995 
merger of Shawmut National, headquartered in Massachusetts, with 
Fleet Financial, headquartered in Rhode Island. For this reason, we 
exclude observations from Massachusetts and Rhode Island for the 
affected years. We also run a specification that excludes these two 
states for all years.108 The results are not meaningfully different. In 
addition, a recent Federal Reserve study found that bank headquarters 
have been moving from small cities to larger cities (particularly New 
York City) over the 1990s,109 but most of the abolition states are 
small and lack large cities. 
As a further check, we also use average account size as a depend-
ent variable. Average account size is computed by dividing total re-
ported assets by the number of reported accounts. A swing up or 
down in reported assets caused by a merger should be correlated with 
a corresponding swing up or down in the number of accounts. Thus, 
average account size should be less sensitive than total assets to dis-
 
107. ROBERT DEYOUNG & THOMAS KLIER, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI., FED LET-
TER NO. 201, WHY BANKONE LEFT CHICAGO: ONE PIECE IN A BIGGER PUZZLE, 3 
tbl.3 (2004), available at 
 http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/aflapril2004_201.pdf. 
108. In 1998, the same year that Illinois abolished the RAP, First Bank of Chi-
cago and Bank One of Columbus, Ohio merged, with the headquarters remaining in 
Chicago. However, based on institution-level data for 2001 obtained from the 
FDIC’s website, it appears that First Bank continues to report as an Ohio bank, and 
Ohio abolished the RAP in 1999. There were some significant mergers between 
control states (California and North Carolina for example), which cause substantial 
swings between those states in reported assets. But as these mergers simply shifted 
money between control states, they should not have an effect on our coefficient es-
timates. 
109. Tyler Diacon & Thomas H. Klier, Where the Headquarters are—Evidence 
from Large Public Companies 1990-2000, at 6 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Working 
Paper No. 35, 2003). 
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tortion from mergers or branching. Average account size is also a 
meaningful variable in its own right for reasons we discuss in the 
empirical analysis below. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Our analysis of the data proceeds in three steps. First, in Section 
A we present an initial discussion of the raw data. In leading states 
such as South Dakota, Delaware, and Illinois, the effect of abolishing 
the Rule is so profound that simple graphical depictions are highly 
suggestive. Second, in Sections B and C we present a formal econo-
metric analysis that employs a standard difference-in-difference re-
gression methodology that controls for contemporaneous changes in 
state law and relevant economic factors. Third, in Section D we offer 
a nontechnical synthesis of our findings. Readers interested in our re-
sults, but not in the formal methodology, will find Sections A and D 
of principal interest. 
A. Initial Data Analysis 
Figure 1 presents reported trust assets and average account sizes 
from 1985 to 2003 based on raw numbers and without an adjustment 
for inflation. Trust assets and average account sizes track each other 
closely, rising every year in a fairly smooth linear trend until 2000, 
followed by a sizeable dip in 2001, which may reflect stock market 
fluctuations.110 
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
 
In the next five graphs we compare trends in reported trust assets 
in leading abolition states to each other, their neighboring states, and 
national averages. Because differences in population and local 
economies make graphical comparisons of total assets across states 
almost meaningless, in our comparisons we use trust assets per per-
son or average account size. Dividing total assets by state population 
reduces the influence of population and highlights the success of 
small states such as Delaware and South Dakota. Dividing total assets 
by number of accounts (that is, average account size) likewise facili-
tates comparison across states. In addition, average account size is an 
 
110. A cursory glance at this and the subsequent state level graphs suggests that 
in some states trust fund values are sensitive to fluctuations in public equities mar-
kets. We are in the process of testing this hypothesis as part of a separate empirical 
study of trust asset allocation.  
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important variable in its own right for two reasons. First, average ac-
count size is less sensitive than total assets to the potential biasing ef-
fect of bank mergers and consolidations. Second, because the current 
exemption from the GST tax is $1.5 million and for much of the pe-
riod under study was $1 million, an upswing in average account size 
above those figures implies not only an influx of trust assets but also 
that a fair amount of those assets are not transfer-tax exempt. 
Figure 2 presents the trust assets per person in the important abo-
lition states of Delaware and South Dakota in comparison to New 
York, a leading banking state, and to the national average. Delaware 
abolished the RAP in 1995, and South Dakota abolished the RAP in 
1983, prior to the start of our data. As can be seen, South Dakota 
starts out with trust assets per person just below the national average 
at the beginning of the sample timeframe. By the mid-1990s, how-
ever, South Dakota’s assets per person exceed the national average 
and equals or exceeds that of New York. 
Having long been a trust-friendly jurisdiction,111 Delaware’s as-
sets per person begin at a very high level with an unexplained blip in 
1991 and 1992, prior to abolition, then experience a strong upward 
trend in the mid-1990s, roughly coinciding with Delaware’s abolition 
of the RAP. We have no good explanation for the 1991-1992 blip. 
Given Delaware’s otherwise smooth upward trend, we could interpo-
late the data for 1991 and 1992. However, this unexplained increase 
in trust assets occurs prior to Delaware’s abolition of the RAP. As 
such, if included in our analysis, it would tend to bias our estimate of 
the effect of abolishing the Rule downward, working against a posi-
tive finding. For this reason, we have chosen the more conservative 
approach of accepting the data as reported by the FDIC. 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 
In the next few graphs we compare average account sizes in 
Delaware, South Dakota, and Illinois (another important abolition 
state112) to their neighboring states. We do so for illustrative purposes 
only. All states, not just those that are geographically proximate to 
abolishing states, are included in the formal econometric analysis. 
 
111. See supra note 61. 
112. Illinois banks and lawyers have been particularly effective at securing law 
reform. For example, Illinois was one of the first states to revise its trust investment 
law in light of modern portfolio theory, see John H. Langbein, The Uniform Pru-
dent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 641-42 
(1996), and Illinois statutory law makes the preparation of an inter vivos trust by 
anyone other than a lawyer or institutional trustee unlawful. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 505/2BB (1999). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
PERPETUITIES 8/30/2005 3:39:21 PM 
132 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. nn:nnn 
We begin in Figure 3 with a comparison of Delaware to Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, and New York. Delaware and New York start out with 
similar average account sizes, but Delaware rapidly outpaces New 
York in the mid-1990s, roughly coincident with the abolition of the 
RAP in Delaware. Neither Pennsylvania nor Maryland are in the 
same league as Delaware. Even after the precipitous drop in average 
account size in Delaware after the stock market decline of the early 
2000s, Delaware’s average trust account size at the end of our sample 
timeframe is about double that in Pennsylvania and Maryland. Al-
though Maryland abolished the Rule in 1998, since 1988 it has levied 
a fiduciary income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. We 
posit that aversion to this tax explains Maryland’s inability to com-
pete with Delaware. The econometric analysis below supports this 
hypothesis. 
 
[Insert figure 3 here] 
 
South Dakota, which we examine in Figure 4, presents a clearer 
picture. In the mid-1980s, South Dakota’s average account size was 
slightly larger than North Dakota’s and Iowa’s. The gap between the 
states begins to grow after 1987, with the implementation of the GST 
tax, and increases notably in the mid-1990s. This latter increase coin-
cides with the abolition of the RAP in Delaware and the subsequent 
nationwide movement to abolish the RAP. In addition, at about the 
same time the Governor of South Dakota formed a task force to study 
the South Dakota trust laws and to recommend reforms “to allow 
South Dakota to continue its position as a highly desirable jurisdic-
tion in which to locate trusts.”113  
 
[Insert figure 4 here] 
 
Illinois, which we examine in Figure 5, abolished the RAP in 
1998. Average account size in Illinois increased by roughly 70% two 
years later, from $1.4 million to nearly $2.5 million. This increased 
average account size remained stable even in the face of the stock 
market decline of the early 2000s (which is consistent with a contin-
ued influx of assets). Chicago is a significant banking center and 
home to the prominent Northern Trust Company.114 
 
 113. Michael J. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments 
and Economic Development: The Tort of “Negligent Trust Situs” at Its Incipient 
Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662, 664 (1999). 
 114. Because of the large and relatively immediate of effect of abolition on av-
erage account size in Illinois, the reader may be concerned that our results are 
driven entirely by Illinois. However, as illustrated by Figure 6, infra, the swift in-
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[Insert figure 5 here] 
 
Interestingly, Wisconsin, which abolished the RAP long before 
the introduction of the GST tax, appears to have been unable to com-
pete with Illinois. As in the case of Delaware and Maryland, we posit 
that the disparity between Illinois and Wisconsin is a result of their 
different FIT rules. During the period under study, Illinois did not tax 
income in trust funds attracted from out of state, but for most years 
Wisconsin did. The econometric analysis below supports this hy-
pothesis. 
Another interesting implication of this graph is that after Illinois 
abolished the RAP its trust institutions experienced an influx of large 
trusts that were probably not wholly transfer-tax-exempt. The exemp-
tion from the GST and estate taxes is currently $1.5 million and for 
most of the period under study was $1 million. Yet average account 
size in Illinois rose quickly from less than $1.5 million to about $2.5 
million after the RAP was abolished. The implication is that a fair 
number of the new accounts were worth more than $1.5 million. To 
the extent that the initial funding of such trusts exceeded $1 or $1.5 
million, the excess is subject to federal wealth transfer taxes. In a 
similar vein, observe that Delaware, like Illinois, experienced a rapid 
increase in its average account size, which at the time Delaware abol-
ished the RAP already exceeded the exemption amount (see Figure 3 
above and Figure 6 below). 
We conjecture that the inflow of very large accounts reflects the 
administrative efficiencies of locating all of one’s trust assets in a 
single account with one institutional trustee. Under typical fee sched-
ules, larger accounts pay a smaller percentage in fees relative to 
smaller accounts,115 and professional fiduciaries are willing to nego-
tiate even lower fees for (and to give more personal service to) larger 
 
crease in Illinois merely brought Illinois up from the national average to an average 
account size comparable with that of New York and Delaware. Further, in unre-
ported regressions, we find that our estimate of the effect of abolition excluding Il-
linois remains statistically significant, albeit somewhat less so. 
115. The June 2004 fee schedule for the Chicago-based Northern Trust Com-
pany is as follows: a minimum annual fee of $12,500 for any size trust up to $1 
million, plus 0.80% for the next $2 million; 0.70% for the next $2 million; 0.50% 
for the next $5 million; 0.45% for the next $5 million; 0.45% for the next $15 mil-
lion; and 0.40% for the next $25 million. NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY SCHEDULE 
OF FEES (on file with the YALE LAW JOURNAL). Under this schedule the annual fee 
for a $3 million trust would be $28,500 and for a $10 million trust would be 
$67,500. The prominent Wilmington Trust Company, located in Delaware, has 
similar published rates: a minimum annual fee of $10,000 for any size trust up to 
$1 million, plus 1% of the next $1 million; 0.75% for the next $3 million; 0.50% 
for the next $5 million; and 0.35% for the next $10 million. WILMINGTON TRUST 
COMPANY SCHEDULE OF FEES (on file with the YALE LAW JOURNAL).  
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accounts.116 On this view the availability of perpetual transfer-tax-
exempt trusts provides an opening to attract all of the donor’s trust 
business. 
In Figure 6 we compare average account sizes in Delaware, Illi-
nois, New York, South Dakota, and the national average. Many of the 
trends remarked above are again discernable. The trend in average 
trust account size in Delaware roughly tracks that of New York until 
Delaware abolished the RAP in 1995, whereupon Delaware outpaces 
New York in all subsequent years. Average account size in South 
Dakota, which had abolished the RAP prior to the enactment of the 
GST tax, trails the national average until the mid-1990s. By 1998, 
when Illinois abolished its RAP, South Dakota catches up to the na-
tional average. Average account size in Illinois, which prior to 1998 
more or less tracks the national average, breaks away and substan-
tially outpaces it from that point forward, catching up with New York 
in 2000 and Delaware in 2002. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 here.] 
 
In our view, the foregoing graphs support the hypothesis that 
those states that abolished the RAP and did not tax income in trusts 
attracted from out of state experienced a significant inflow of large 
trust funds upon abolishing the Rule. This hypothesis is borne out in 
the econometric analysis below. 
These data also suggest that the abolition of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities prior to the introduction of the GST tax had no observ-
able effect on a state’s trust assets. Recall that Wisconsin (1969), 
Idaho (1957), and South Dakota (1983) abolished the RAP by statute 
prior to the 1986 enactment of the GST tax, and that throughout this 
period South Dakota did not have a FIT.117 Yet in 1985 and 1986, the 
two years prior to the GST tax that are included in our sample time-
frame, the average account size in each of these states closely 
matched those of their neighboring states and trailed the national av-
erage. 
Let us examine the numbers directly. In 1985 and 1986, the aboli-
tion states had average account sizes between 35% and 50% below 
 
116. See Robert Frank, Rich, Richer, Richest: Private Banks’ Class System, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2004, at D; see also WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY SCHED-
ULE OF FEES, supra note 105 (indicating that fees on accounts in excess of $20 mil-
lion are individually negotiated) (on file with the YALE LAW JOURNAL). 
117. By judicial decision Wisconsin may have abolished its Rule even earlier. 
See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973, 
974-75 (1965). We need not resolve whether it did so, however, because our data 
does not begin until 1985, well after Wisconsin’s statutory repeal. 
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the national average, with little difference between them and their 
surrounding states. In the case of Wisconsin, average account size in 
1985 and 1986 was below that of surrounding states. In South Da-
kota, average account size in 1985 and 1986 was slightly ahead of 
North Dakota and Iowa. In Idaho, which is not graphed above, aver-
age account size was $224,000 in 1985 and $211,000 in 1986, com-
parable to its neighbor Montana, which had average trust sizes of 
$180,000 in 1985 and $220,000 in 1986. 
The early abolition states also had average account sizes much 
smaller than the national average in 1985 and 1986. In 1985 the aver-
age account size nationally was $393,000, while average account 
sizes in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin were $224,000, 
$228,000, and $257,000 respectively. In 1986, the figures were 
$448,000 nationally, and $211,000, $237,000, and $275,000, respec-
tively, in Idaho, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Similar results obtain 
if we consider trust assets per person. There is little evidence, there-
fore, that people valued perpetual trusts prior to the GST tax.118 As an 
initial matter, we infer that without the GST tax incentive to act as a 
wedge, few individuals would establish perpetual trusts. Further, our 
analysis of the data from 1969 through 1984, which we present in a 
forthcoming study, strongly support this conclusion.119 
A. The Estimation Strategy 
We estimate the effect of abolishing the RAP using four different 
dependent variables and several model specifications. We examine 
the effect of the abolition of the rule on total trust assets (Table 1), 
log trust assets (Table 2), average account size (Table 3), and total 
number of accounts (Table 4). We also consider trust assets per per-
son in Appendix B. 
The most straightforward specification is a simple before-and-
after comparison using a dummy variable equaling one after a state 
abolishes the RAP and zero otherwise. This specification takes the 
form: 
 
118. For this reason, we do not code the RAP as abolished in South Dakota, 
Idaho, or Wisconsin prior to the introduction GST tax. Technically, we should code 
these states as abolition states prior to 1987 and then interact the effect of the GST 
tax with the abolition dummy. However, this would leave only six identifying ob-
servations in the main effect. In addition, there were no statistically significant dif-
ferences between these and other states in trust assets, average account size, or as-
sets per person prior to 1987, which leads us to conclude that the effect of the 
abolition of the RAP is driven by the GST tax. The results differ little in either 
case, but are slightly more significant if we code all pre-GST years as non-abolition 
years. 
119. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12. 
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[Insert equation 1 here] 
 
where j indexes state and t indexes time. The variable Abolish equals 
one beginning the year after a state abolishes the RAP. The coeffi-
cient η  gives a simple before-after comparison of the effect of aboli-
tion. Some states abolished the RAP early in the year, others did so 
late in the year. Given the reality that it takes time to draft new trust 
forms and for clients to execute them, we begin counting a state as 
having abolished the RAP in the first year after the year of abolition. 
(The results when we included the year of abolition were slightly 
weaker, but little-changed.) Year represents a matrix of year dum-
mies, which remove the effects of market fluctuations, inflation, and 
economic growth. State represents a matrix of state dummies, which 
remove state average differences. Therefore, every model conditions 
on state fixed-effects, which means that changes are measured rela-
tive to the state average. All models include state and year dummies. 
The simple difference-in-differences specification described 
above is open to a few potential biases. The states that abolish the 
Rule may be the states that are most responsive to the demands of lo-
cal banks and trust lawyers. Hence, these states may have adopted 
other reforms simultaneously. To account for this possibility, we add 
controls for two other important margins in the jurisdictional compe-
tition for trust funds: (1) the recognition of APTs, and (2) whether a 
state levies an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. In 
the hope of throwing light on the Waggoner/Dukeminier debate over 
USRAP, we also (3) add a control for whether a state has adopted 
USRAP.120 
Further, we account for two more factors that may lead to state 
differences: population and individual income. Larger and wealthier 
populations will tend to have more and larger trusts. Hence, we add 
yearly census estimates to control for state population and, as a proxy 
for wealth, yearly estimated state-aggregate personal income. 
Another concern is that secular trends in states that abolished the 
RAP might be driving any positive findings.121 We therefore include 
state-specific linear time trends in some specifications. Yet another 
way to test for biasing trends is to include dummy variables for the 
 
120. Because of the merger and branching issues discussed above, the coeffi-
cient estimates on these controls may be biased when aggregate trust assets and ac-
counts are considered and should be interpreted cautiously. For the reasons detailed 
earlier, we are more confident of the results when we consider average account 
sizes. 
121. By “secular trends,” we mean general time trends that are not explained by 
any of the available independent variables. 
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years prior to the abolition of the RAP. In some specifications we in-
clude dummies for two years prior to abolition, the year before the 
abolition, and the year of the abolition. 
In Specification 1 and its variants, we code Abolish as a dummy 
variable, which would accurately reflect the effect of abolition only if 
abolition results in an immediate and discrete jump in assets. Hence 
Specification 1 imposes a strong functional form on the effect of 
abolishing the RAP, which may be ill-suited to the phenomenon for 
at least two reasons. First, for the bar to digest the change in the law 
and to sell the new product to clients takes time. The GST tax and the 
Rule Against Perpetuities are complex, and the interaction of the two 
was not immediately obvious.  
Second, because existing trusts in non-abolition states are drafted 
to comply with the Rule,122 and because moving a trust often requires 
judicial approval, the phenomenon is probably driven by new trust 
funds rather than the movement of existing trusts. If so, the effect of 
abolition will be gradual as new trusts are created and accumulate. 
Specification 1, however, assumes a perfectly liquid market in trust 
funds with no transaction costs and no agency costs between lawyers 
and clients.123 
A further problem with the assumptions underpinning Specifica-
tion 1 is that as additional states abolished the RAP in the mid-1990s, 
the competition for trust business became fiercer. With an increasing 
number of perpetual trust jurisdictions, the payoff to abolition might 
well shrink (eventually the payoff might be more in the nature of re-
taining assets than attracting them124). If so, the effect of abolition 
may decrease over time. With these factors in mind, we allow the ef-
fect of reform to increase and decrease over time by entering a quad-
ratic term for reform as follows: 
 
[Insert equation 2 here] 
 
As discussed earlier, not all states levy an income tax on trust 
funds attracted from out of state. While the tax burden varies within a 
taxing state because of increasing marginal rates, we think a dummy 
variable specification for FIT as YES or NO, as defined earlier, is 
sufficient. First, controlling for increasing marginal rates, particularly 
 
122.  See Sterk, supra note 32, at 2117 n.81. 
123. Cf. Myers & Samp, supra note 113, at 671-79 (assessing the possibility of 
attorney liability for negligent trust situs). 
124. Noting that “[o]ther states have enacted similar measures,” the staff of the 
Arizona Senate explained that Arizona’s perpetual trust legislation (ARIZ. STAT. § 
14-2901) was “an effort to retain people who want to set up [perpetual trusts] in 
state.” FACT SHEET FOR S.B. 1112., S. 112, 47th Leg., Reg. Session (Az. 1998). 
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where, as here, we do not observe individual accounts, is not feasible. 
Moreover, many states do not levy a FIT on trust funds attracted from 
out of state (these states are coded as NO for FIT in Table 5). Once 
the settlor decides to incur the costs of settling a trust out-of-state, the 
marginal cost of choosing a state that will not levy a FIT on the 
trust’s income is close to zero. Hence, our binary coding scheme is 
likely to comport with actual practice. 
Fortunately for our estimation strategy, there are RAP states and 
abolition states that do not tax, and a handful of states changed their 
tax treatment of trust funds attracted from out of state during our 
sample time period. (One abolition state changed its tax status: Wis-
consin switched to NO for FIT in 1999. Florida abolished the RAP 
and its tax at the same time in 2001.) Thus, we estimate the following 
model, interacting tax status with the abolition dummy: 
 
[Insert equation 3 here] 
 
In Specification 3 the primary coefficient of interest is β , which 
measures the marginal impact of eliminating both non-resident trust 
taxes and the RAP. We also report a specification interacting the No-
FIT variable with the quadratic term. 
The data used are state-level panel data. The specification strat-
egy used state fixed effects to deal with state error terms. Random-
effects models were also employed, and yielded surprisingly similar 
coefficient estimates and standard errors. In practice, fixed effects are 
favored for state panels such as this, so we report those results. In ad-
dition, we ran feasible generalized least squares regressions allowing 
for panel-specific autocorrelation. The results for the interaction ef-
fects (which we believe to be the correct specification) survived 
largely intact. Accordingly, all reported regressions are OLS and in-
clude a constant term, state dummies, and year dummies. 
Because APTs were adopted in only a few states, all toward the 
end of the sample timeframe, we have few observations on them. 
Further, in the period under study, Nevada was the only state that 
both retained the Rule Against Perpetuities and adopted APTs, hav-
ing authorized them in 1999. Therefore, in one specification we ex-
clude the three joint abolition/APT states (Delaware, Alaska, and 
Rhode Island) from the estimation entirely to confirm that our results 
are driven by the abolition of the RAP, not by APTs. In these specifi-
cations, we also exclude Massachusetts because of the merger event 
discussed above. 
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C. Econometric Results 
We examine several different measures of a state’s competitive-
ness in trust assets: total assets (Table 1), log total assets (Table 2), 
average account size (Table 3), and number of accounts (Table 4).  
1. Trust Assets (Tables 1 and 2) 
The regressions reported in Table 1 use total reported assets as 
the dependent variable. Model 1 estimates Specification 1, which is 
the effect of abolition conditioned only on year and state fixed ef-
fects. The coefficient estimate on Abolish is 6.63 and is significant at 
the 5% level, implying that after a state abolished the RAP, it at-
tracted $6.63 billion more in reported trust assets relative to states 
that did not abolish the RAP. To put this finding in perspective, the 
average state had $19 billion in reported trust assets in 2003. Given 
that smaller states such as Alaska, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and 
Idaho were among the first to abolish the RAP, this result is even lar-
ger than a comparison to the overall state average implies. 
Model 2 adds some additional dependent variables, and the coef-
ficient on Abolish decreases slightly to 6.02. None of the trust law 
variables—APTs, USRAP, or FIT—are significant at the 5% level. 
While state income is significant and signed positively as expected, 
the effect of state population is surprisingly negative and significant, 
implying that increases in population decrease relative trust assets. 
We suspect, however, that this result is nothing more than an artifact 
of how strong the competition for trust assets has been from the small 
states. Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska, which are among the 
most aggressive of the abolishing jurisdictions, have small popula-
tions. 
Model 3 includes dummy variables for the year of abolition and 
for each of the prior two years. No strong trends are discernable. In 
Model 4, which adds state-specific trends, the coefficient on Abolish 
decreases to 3.97, but remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, the exclusion of Alaska, Delaware, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island in Model 5 makes little difference to the coefficient es-
timate, though now the result is barely significant at the 5% level. 
In sum, our simple before-after specification suggests that state 
trust assets significantly increased after the abolition of the RAP, and 
this result is robust to the inclusion of time trends and the exclusion 
of asset-protection states. Taking the coefficient as correct, a back-of-
the-envelope calculation of the total trust assets attracted by abolish-
ing the RAP is striking. Within the timeframe of our sample 16 states 
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abolished the RAP with a resulting average increase of roughly $6 
billion in trust assets per state. This implies that as of 2003, roughly 
$100 billion in trust funds have poured into the states that have abol-
ished the Rule ($6 billion per state x 17 states = $102 billion in total 
assets).  
We must emphasize, however, that this $100 billion figure is a 
rough estimate given the standard errors.125 Further, we we cannot 
discern the extent to which the observed increase in trust assets re-
flects an inflow of newly created trusts or the poaching of already ex-
isting trusts. On the other hand, because our sample includes only of 
trusts administered by federally-reporting institutions, our estimates 
probably understate the total increase in trust assets experienced by 
the abolishing states. Likewise, the quadratic models imply that these 
are underestimates because the effect grows over time (at least for the 
first ten years or so), but the Abolish coefficient is simply the average 
effect by state, most of which abolished the RAP in the late 1990s.  
We now turn to the effect of FITs. Model 6 allows an interaction 
between NoFIT and Abolish. Here the coefficient on Abolish is indis-
tinguishable from zero, while the coefficient on the interaction term 
NoFIT*Abolish is 14, roughly twice as large as the effect of Abolish 
before. We interpret these coefficients to imply that a state that abol-
ished the Rule, but taxed income in trust funds attracted from out of 
state, experienced no observable increase in trust business. By con-
trast, a state that abolished the Rule and did not tax income in such 
trusts experienced an average increase in reported trust assets of $14 
billion. This finding strongly implies that the increases we observe 
stem from the inflow of assets from out of state. (In principal, the 
NoFIT*Abolish coefficient of 14 should be weighed against the 
seemingly anomalous negative coefficient on NoFIT. We discuss this 
qualification in greater detail below.) 
The quadratic specification in Model 7, which tests jointly sig-
nificant at the 0.032 level and so appears to fit the data well, yields 
some very interesting results. The coefficient on Years Abolished is 
positive, and the squared term is negative, suggesting an effect that 
 
125. The 95% confidence interval implies that between $11 billion and $200 
billion poured into the abolishing states (i.e., there is a 95% chance that the true 
point estimate lies somewhere within this range). We could also calculate this fig-
ure using the coefficients given in Model 6. Ten states (counting Wisconsin) abol-
ished the Rule and did not tax trust funds attracted from out of state. If we ignore 
the coefficients on Abolish and NoFIT, we have $14 billion per state x 10 states = 
$140 billion (and a 95% confidence interval between $50 billion and $220 billion). 
If we subtract off the negative NoFIT coefficient (-6.5) we have $7.5 billion per 
state x 10 states = $75 billion. The NoFIT result is significant at the .039 level and 
disappears in other specifications, so it is not clear how to treat it for these pur-
poses.  
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increases and then decreases over time.Taking the coefficients at face 
value, a state increases its trust assets each year after the abolition of 
the RAP, peaking roughly 10 years after abolition. This result is con-
sistent with our learning hypothesis. The fact that the effect of aboli-
tion eventually slows is consistent with increased competition as 
more states abolished the RAP in the late 1990s and early 2000s.126 
When the quadratic is interacted with NoFIT in Model 8, the results 
again indicate that nearly all of the observable effect of abolition 
emanates from abolition states that do not levy an income tax on trust 
funds attracted from out of state. 
As a robustness check, we replicate some of these regressions in 
Table 2 using log trust assets as the dependent variable. The effect of 
using log trust assets is two-fold. First, it reduces the influence of out-
lier states with large trust assets, such as New York and Delaware. 
Second, the coefficient on Abolish is now interpreted as the propor-
tion increase in trust assets after abolition (e.g., a coefficient of .25 on 
Abolish would imply trust funds increased by 25% after abolition). 
In the first three models, the results on our variables of interest 
are remarkably similar to Table 1 and imply that trust assets increase 
by roughly 20% after a state abolishes the Rule. In the quadratic 
specification in Model 5, the coefficients are not jointly significant, 
although the terms are signed the same as in Table 1 with roughly the 
same relative magnitude. However, when the NoFIT interactions are 
added to the quadratic specification, the results are strongly signifi-
cant and comparable to those in Table 1. This finding again suggests 
that abolition mainly increases the trust assets of those states that also 
did not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. 
There are two somewhat anomalous findings we wish to address. 
First, the USRAP results in both Tables 1 and 2 are positive and 
sometimes statistically significant at the 5% level or close to it. Sec-
ond, in both tables the NoFIT dummy is negative and significant 
when it is interacted with Abolish.  
In our view, the weak USRAP results in Tables 1 and 2 do not 
provide sufficient grounds to conclude that adoption of USRAP had 
an effect on a state’s trust assets. First, the USRAP results in Tables 1 
and 2 are not replicated in the other regressions. Second, when we 
take log trust assets as our dependent variable in Table 2, the USRAP 
coefficient is significant only in Model 4.  
Third, the coefficients become very small and insignificant in 
both Tables 1 and 2 when state-specific trends are entered (this result 
recurs when we take the number of accounts as our dependent vari-
 
126. As previously noted, stock market effects and other yearly fluctuations are 
removed by the inclusion of year dummies.   
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able in Table 4). That the USRAP results are positive without state-
specific trends, but disappear with state-specific trends, is consistent 
with the hypothesis that states that adopted USRAP had contempora-
neously growing trust business. States with growing trust business are 
likely to have an organized trust bar, and prior to the repeal move-
ment USRAP was popular with trust lawyers.127 
Fourth, we are not as confident with respect to USRAP as we are 
with respect to abolition that our methodology has removed the po-
tentially biasing effects of bank mergers. The USRAP coefficient is 
never statistically significant when we consider average account size 
in Table 3, which is the dependent variable least affected by mergers. 
Further, when we take trust assets per state resident as our dependent 
variable in Appendix Table 1, the USRAP results are at times nega-
tive and significant.  
In sum, our USRAP results allow us to conclude only that the 
data do not support the proposition that enactment of USRAP leads to 
an increase in the state’s reported trust assets. 
We turn now to the negative NoFIT results. The coefficient on 
NoFIT is only negative and significant when we interact NoFIT and 
Abolish. Technically, one should add all three coefficients (NoFIT, 
Abolish, and Abolish*NoFIT) to get the full interactive effect of abol-
ishing the RAP and not taxing income in trusts attracted from out of 
state. For example, in Model 6 of Table 1 the coefficient on Abolish 
is small (-0.98) and not significant, so we can ignore it. The NoFIT 
coefficient is -6.51 and significant at the 5% level, implying that the 
full effect of abolishing the RAP and not taxing trust funds attracted 
from out of state is more on the order of $7.5 billion, not $14 bil-
lion.128 This result recurs in Table 2, but is even more pronounced. 
Importantly, however, these negative NoFIT coefficients do not alter 
our central conclusions that (1) abolishing the RAP increases the 
state’s reported trust assets, and (2) all of the observable effect of 
abolition comes from states that also did not levy an income tax on 
trusts attracted from out of state. The key results are that the main ef-
fect of Abolish disappears and the interacted effect is large and sig-
nificant. 
The counterintuitive negative NoFIT coefficient probably results 
from specification error. First, the NoFIT coefficient was generally 
small and not statistically significant prior to the interaction. Second, 
the before-and-after comparisons impose some strong conditions on 
the data. Inasmuch as the more flexible quadratic specifications 
strongly suggest that the effect of abolition decayed over time, in our 
 
127. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 836. 
128. See supra note 125 and text accompanying. 
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simple interaction we may be forcing the negative result into the tax 
term. Notice that the significant, negative tax result goes away in the 
quadratic interaction in both Tables 1 and 2. Third, the NoFIT coeffi-
cient is never significant when we take average account size to be the 
dependent variable in Table 3. Finally, only five states changed their 
tax policies. As a result, we do not have much identifying informa-
tion on NoFIT, so it is not surprising that the coefficient on NoFIT is 
sensitive to model specifications.129 
2. Average Account Size (Table 3) 
Average account size is an important dependent variable for a 
number of reasons. First, as noted above, average account size should 
be less sensitive to the potential bias from mergers and branching. 
Second, the exemption from the transfer taxes is today $1.5 million 
and for much of the period under study was $1 million. Hence, an in-
crease in average account size above those numbers implies an influx 
of trust assets that are not exempt from transfer taxation. Third, there 
are economies to locating all of one’s trust assets in a single account 
with one institutional trustee because larger accounts pay a smaller 
percentage in fees relative to smaller accounts and substantial clients 
get better service.130 Thus, there is reason to suspect that banks and 
trust companies lobbied for the abolition of the RAP as a gateway to 
attract all the trust business of wealthy settlors.  
The results for average account size, which track the abolition re-
sults for total trust assets (Table 1), are reported in Table 3.131 In the 
simple specification of Model 1, abolition of the rule raises average 
account size by $289,000. To put this figure in perspective, the aver-
age account size in 2003 was about $1 million. The effect of abolition 
decreases to $191,000 when we include more control variables in 
Model 2, probably because APTs are found to have a large effect 
(roughly $507,000) and, of the four APT states, three also abolished 
the RAP. Not surprisingly, the joint significance of the two taken to-
gether is very strong (roughly the 0.0001 level) in Models 2 and 3. 
However, the estimated effect of APTs is negative (but not signifi-
cant) when we include state-specific trends in Model 4, and when we 
exclude the primary APT states in Model 5, the effect of abolition 
remains significant but decreases to $150,000. Accordingly, the ef-
 
129. Because we include state fixed-effects in every model, we can identify 
policy effects only from those states that changed policies in the timeframe of the 
data. 
130. See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
131. Note that, because we are using average trust size, we use state income per 
capita as the dependent variable instead of gross income and population. 
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fect of abolition is clear and consistent across models, while the ef-
fect of validating APTs is not consistent.132 
The interaction between Abolish and NoFIT in Model 6 suggests, 
consistent with our previous results, that most of the effect on ac-
count size comes from abolition states that do not levy a tax on in-
come in trusts attracted from out of state. The quadratic specification 
of Model 7 suggests an increasing but decaying effect over time, but 
is not jointly significant. However, interaction of the quadratic term 
with NoFIT yields coefficients that are jointly significant at less than 
the .0001 level,133 and these coefficients are consistent with our pre-
vious findings. Specifically, the interaction results imply an increas-
ing-then-decreasing growth in average account size in those states 
that abolished the RAP and do not levy an income tax on trust funds 
attracted from out of state.  
In sum, average account size increases by nearly $200,000 after 
the RAP is abolished, and this effect comes almost entirely from 
states that did not tax income in trusts attracted from out of state. As 
before, the quadratic specification suggests that the effect of abolish-
ing the Rule initially increases trust assets but then the effect wanes. 
Thus, our results for aggregate trust assets are largely replicated for 
average account size. 
3. Total Number of Accounts (Table 4) 
Table 4 reports the results of regressions that use total reported 
state accounts as the dependent variable. In this case, the dummy 
variable specifications yield insignificant results and small coefficient 
estimates. However, the quadratic term in Model 5 is jointly signifi-
cant and signed as before. Though neither the linear nor the squared 
term is independently significant, their joint significance of 0.0423 
implies that there was an increase in the number of accounts after a 
state abolished the RAP. Taking the coefficients at face value, the 
first year a state abolishes the RAP it draws nearly 700 additional ac-
counts relative to non-abolition states. Five years after a state abol-
ishes the RAP, it has drawn nearly 2,000 additional accounts. 
The tax interactions are mixed. In Model 3, the interaction term is 
positive but not statistically significant at the 5% level. The quadratic 
interaction in Model 6 is difficult to interpret as well. Taking the co-
 
132. The results for total assets suggest the same conclusion. In Table 1 the 
APT coefficient, which was positive (but not significant) in Model 2, became nega-
tive and significant when we added state-specific trends in Model 4. 
133. Indeed, although not report in the table, the quadratic interaction terms are 
jointly statistically significant at the 0.0001 level independent of the main effects.  
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art14
PERPETUITIES 8/30/2005 3:39:21 PM 
200n] Desktop Publishing Example 145 
efficients at face value, accounts decrease and then increase in states 
that abolish the RAP, but this effect is reversed in states that abolish 
the RAP and do not tax. The results are strongly jointly significant 
(p-value is 0.0001), however, and the coefficients suggest that ac-
counts grew at an increasing rate after abolition. It is also clear that 
the largest effect again emanates from states that both abolished the 
RAP and do not levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out 
of state. The dummy variable specification (which represents the av-
erage effect over time) suggests a small effect. This implies that even 
if the strongly significant quadratic specification is valid, the net ef-
fect has been quite small. 
The small effect of abolition on total accounts fits neatly with our 
trust-asset and average-account findings: If trust assets increased by 
proportionately more than trust accounts in abolition states, then abo-
lition must be attracting relatively larger accounts. Our findings for 
average account size indicate this to be the case.134  
D. Summary of Results 
In this Section we offer a nontechnical summary of our principal 
findings. 
1. Perpetuities and Fiduciary Income Taxes 
We find that after a state abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
its reported trust assets through 2003 increased by as much as 20% 
relative to states that retained the Rule. This finding is replicated for 
average account size, which likewise increased by as much as 20% 
relative to states that retained the Rule. In dollars, after a state abol-
ished the Rule, its reported trust assets increased through 2003 by 
roughly $6 billion relative to those that retained the Rule. Average 
account size increased by roughly $200,000. These results are repli-
cated in regressions that exclude Delaware and Alaska, which tells us 
that the phenomenon is not limited to those two states. 
Regarding fiduciary income taxes, we found that, by itself, 
whether a state levies an income tax on trust funds attracted from out 
of state had no observable effect on the state’s reported trust assets. 
This finding is consistent with the incentives created by the federal 
income tax. For many trusts the process of avoiding the federal in-
 
134. These results also imply that mergers are not confounding our results. If 
increases in reported assets in abolition states were driven by the acquisition of 
banks in non-abolition states, we would expect to observe a proportionate increase 
in the number of reported accounts. 
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come tax likewise avoids state income taxes.135 
Perpetual trusts, however, have a different duration and purpose 
from ordinary trusts that might warrant accumulating trust income. 
Although doing so unavoidably triggers federal income tax liability, 
state income tax liability can be avoided by locating the trust in a 
state that does not levy a FIT on trust funds attracted from out of 
state. Accordingly, we predicted that the effect of abolishing the Rule 
would be magnified in states that did not tax income in trust funds at-
tracted from out of state.136 
To assess this prediction, we tested the interactive effect of a 
state’s income tax and perpetuities laws. These tests indicate that 
only those states that did not tax income in trusts attracted from out 
of state experienced an inflow of trust assets after abolishing the 
Rule. States that abolished the Rule but taxed such trusts experienced 
no observable increase in reported trust assets. These findings are 
consistent with our theoretical intuitions. Once a settlor has commit-
ted to incurring the costs of establishing an out-of-state perpetual 
trust, the marginal cost of choosing a state that does not tax trusts at-
tracted from out-of-state is close to zero but the benefits are poten-
tially great. 
We conclude that the effect of abolishing the Rule is substantial. 
Our findings imply that, through 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust 
funds have poured into the states that have validated perpetual 
trusts.137 Assuming the applicability of typical industry commission 
schedules, these funds are worth perhaps as much as $1 billion in 
yearly trustees’ commissions.138  
We hasten to add three caveats. First, we cannot estimate the tax 
revenue lost owing to the use of perpetual transfer-tax-exempt trusts. 
Such an estimate would require complex actuarial discounting based 
on individual account data, but we have only state-level data. The 
most we can say is that not all the trust dollars that have poured into 
the abolishing states are transfer-tax exempt. After abolishing the 
Rule, average account size in Illinois and Delaware both increased 
 
135. See supra Subsection I.D.2. 
136. See id. 
137. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
138. For typical commission schedules, see supra note 115. The $1 billion fig-
ure is a very rough estimate that assumes a typical account size between $1 million 
and $2 million. Because the data implies that a fair number of much larger trusts 
moved into the abolition states, see supra text accompanying note 115, and larger 
trusts pay a smaller percentage in fees, there is good reason to suppose that this es-
timate overstates the true figure. On the other hand, because our sample of feder-
ally-reporting institutional trustees does not include the entire population of trust 
funds, our estimates probably understate the total increase in trust assets experi-
enced by the abolishing states. 
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and exceeded the transfer-tax exemption.139 
Second, we cannot discern the extent to which any given state’s 
increase in reported trust assets stemmed from an inflow of newly-
created trusts versus the poaching of already-existing trusts.140 Like-
wise, to the extent that our findings represent the movement of al-
ready-existing trusts, we cannot identify from which states those 
trusts moved. 
Third, because our sample data is limited to federally-reporting 
trustees (and so does not include the entire trust fund population), our 
estimates likely understate the amount of trust assets that have moved 
as a result of the movement to abolish the Rule. 
2. Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts 
There is some tentative evidence that validating APTs increases a 
state’s trust business. We did not consistently find this effect, how-
ever, and our findings are highly sensitive to choice of control vari-
ables and regression model. In technical terms, the relevant coeffi-
cient was not consistently signed and in many specifications was not 
statistically significant. Accordingly, we can neither confirm nor 
deny the existence of a significant APT business. The most we can 
say is that, through 2003, the effect on a state’s trust business of vali-
dating APTs is not on the same order of magnitude as the effect of 
abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities. We intend to revisit this 
question soon when more data is available. After the period of our 
study, two more states and possibly a third validated APTs.141 
3. Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities 
We find no consistent evidence that adopting USRAP increases a 
state’s trust business.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DEBATES 
A. The Fall of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
The jurisdictional competition for trust funds is both real and in-
tense. At the behest of local banks and lawyers, since 1986 a third of 
 
139. See supra Section III.A. 
140. Because already-existing trusts in jurisdictions that retained the Rule 
would have been drafted to comply with the Rule, see Sterk, supra note 32, at 2117 
n.81, we conjecture that our results arise primarily from new trusts.  
141. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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the states have altered their laws to give their local banks and lawyers 
a competitive advantage in what our results show is a national market 
for trust fund services. Our estimates imply that, through 2003, the 
movement to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities has affected the 
situs of $100 billion in reported trust assets—roughly 10% of the 
2003 total.142 Not surprisingly, the trend toward abolition has accel-
erated in recent years. 
There is, of course, a growing literature that examines the pros and 
cons of the fall of the Rule,143 an issue that is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. It is enough here to make three observations. First, the existing 
literature lacks a solid empirical foundation, a problem that plagues not 
just domestic scholars but students of the Rule throughout the common 
law world. Recall that in its recent report on perpetuities reform, the 
English Law Commission lamented the lack of empirical evidence (and 
the impossibility of obtaining any) on the Rule’s effect.144 Accordingly, 
we hope that our findings will illuminate the policy debate, both domes-
tically and abroad, by supplying an empirical analysis of the domestic 
movement to abolish the Rule.145 To that end, we discuss below a re-
cent proposal by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation to close 
the perpetuities loophole in the GST tax.146 As we shall see, the staff 
based its analysis in part on an assumption that our findings show to 
be erroneous. 
Second, much of the existing literature focuses on the evils of per-
petual dead-hand control without discounting those evils in view of 
their likelihood. If a perpetual trust is drafted so that each generation is 
given a special power to appoint the remainder to the next generation 
outright or in further trust as in Case 3 above,147 dead-hand concerns 
 
142. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
143. See supra note 32. 
144. See text accompanying supra note 10. The Law Commission did, how-
ever, conduct a survey of Scottish conveyancing lawyers to learn about the effects, 
if any, of there being no Rule Against Perpetuities in Scotland. See ENGLISH LAW 
COMM’N, supra note 10, at 21-22. Another example of perpetuities reform abroad 
comes from Canada, where the province of Manitoba abolished its Rule over 
twenty years ago. 1982-83-84 S. M. ch. 38, 43; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 721, 723 (discussing perpetuities reform in Manitoba and England).  
145. For example, to the extent that our findings imply that abolishing the Rule 
prior to the enactment of the GST tax had little effect on a state’s trust business, 
they tend to support the proposals of Dukeminier and Krier, supra note 8, against 
the criticisms of Tate, supra note 32. On the other hand, the lack of perpetual trusts 
before the GST tax could stem from a lack of awareness of the possibility. Now that 
the GST tax has given perpetual trusts salience, prospective donors might remain in-
terested in perpetual trusts even if Congress closes the perpetuities loophole in the 
GST tax. We discuss these issues further in Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12. 
For discussion of non-tax reasons to establish a perpetual trust such as protection from 
creditors, see Nenno, supra note 49, at §§ 16, 28. 
146. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 392-95. 
147. See supra text accompanying note 46. Another possibility is the appoint-
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art14
PERPETUITIES 8/30/2005 3:39:21 PM 
200n] Desktop Publishing Example 149 
are resolved. Such a power permits each generation to decide whether 
to continue the trust (and its tax exemption) or to bring the trust to an 
end. We are told that such provisions are boilerplate in perpetual trans-
fer-tax-exempt trust forms.148 On the other hand, even if these clauses 
become ubiquitous in the formbooks, they are not required, and trust 
lawyers have told us anecdotes about settlors who do not include these 
clauses because they seek precisely the perpetual control that the Rule 
was designed to prohibit. 
Third,  settlors who reside in a state that has retained the Rule can 
easily avoid the Rule by paying the small transaction cost required to 
create a trust in, and to move assets to, a state that has abolished the 
Rule. Hence, the federal transfer taxes have mortally wounded the 
once-formidable Rule by reducing it to a mere transaction cost. Of 
course, this is not the first time that federal tax law has warped state 
property law.149 But even if Congress were to close the perpetuities 
loophole in the GST tax, it is difficult to imagine the rise of an inter-
est group that would lobby for reenactment of the Rule Against Per-
petuities.150 Accordingly, to the extent that the policies that underpin 
the Rule continue to have contemporary relevance, it is necessary to 
look elsewhere to service those policies.151 
B. The Rise of the Self-Settled Asset Protection Trust? 
The jurisdictional competition in trust law appears ready to focus 
next on APTs. Indeed, in the last two years two more states and pos-
sibly a third have validated them.152 Because APTs could be used in 
 
ment of a trust protector who is given the power to modify or terminate the trust 
and to name his or her successor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64(2) 
(2003); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 579-80. Modern texts urge the use of 
clauses that preserve flexibility, including the power to modify or terminate the 
trust. See, e.g., PENNELL, supra note 14, at 4-2 to 4-6; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 576. 
148. See, e.g., Nenno,  supra note 49, at 164 (supplying a model clause); see 
also Pierce H. McDowell, III, The Dynasty Trust: Protective Armor for Genera-
tions to Come, TR. & EST., Oct. 1993, at 47, 53 (noting that it “is often desirable to 
give at least some of the beneficiaries special testamentary powers of appointment 
that will enable them to change the dispositive terms of the trust” in light of unan-
ticipated changes in circumstances). 
149. See Ira Mark Bloom, How Federal Transfer Taxes Affect the Development 
of Property Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661 (2000); Robert T. Danforth, The Role of 
Federalism in Administering a National System of Taxation, 57 TAX LAW. 625 
(2004); see also Dukeminier et al., supra note 4, at 428-29 (discussing the move-
ment to adopt community property, which was stimulated in part by a quirk in the 
federal income tax). 
150. This text glosses over the variety of means by which the states have au-
thorized perpetual trusts. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
151. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12. 
152. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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effect to opt out of medical malpractice and almost any other form of 
liability, their validation has sparked a lively policy debate.153 This 
debate involves not only trust law but also touches on tort and bank-
ruptcy reform. For example, the federal bankruptcy reforms adopted 
in April of 2005154 have been criticized by some for not also address-
ing APTs.155 Both before and after the 2005 legislation, an interest in 
trust that is not alienable under state law—which includes the 
settlor’s interest in a domestic APT—does not become part of the 
bankruptcy estate.156 
Unfortunately, as yet our data do not allow us to confirm or deny 
the existence of a significant domestic APT business, though we can 
say that, through 2003, the effect of validating APTs pales in com-
parison to the effect of validating perpetual trusts. As a theoretical 
matter, if domestic APTs become more popular, there is reason to 
suppose that a race to validate APTs will ensue. As we have seen in 
the case of the RAP, local banks and lawyers are adept at obtaining 
legislation to make them more competitive in the national market for 
trust business. Indeed, the current map of APT jurisdictions resem-
bles the perpetual trust map circa 1995, just before Delaware and then 
a host of other states abolished the Rule. On the other hand, the exis-
tence of numerous offshore APT jurisdictions renders the analogy be-
tween APTs and the fall of the RAP imperfect.157 We intend to revisit 
this issue when we have more data. 
 
153. There is a burgeoning academic literature on this question. See supra note 
88. There is also a vast practitioner literature. See, e.g., Barry S. Engel & David L. 
Lockwood, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts Contrasted with Foreign Trusts, 29 EST. 
PLAN. 288 (2002); Nenno, supra note 49, at §§ 69-115; David G. Shaftel, Domestic 
Asset Protection Trusts: Key Issues and Answers, 30 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 10 
(2004). This literature includes practice manuals. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ASSET 
PROTECTION STRATEGIES: PLANNING WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 
(Alexander A. Bove, Jr., ed. 2002); DUNCAN E. OSBORNE & ELIZABETH MORGAN 
SCHURIG, ASSET PROTECTION: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TACTICS 
(2005). On creditor’s rights in trust law generally, see Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift 
Trusts: It’s Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REV. 179 (1993); Adam J. 
Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive perspectives, 
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1995); see also Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Bene-
ficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 
TENN. L. REV. 771 (2002) (examining creditor’s rights under the Uniform Trust Code). 
154. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
155. See Bankrupt Bankruptcy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A30; Albert 
B. Crenshaw, Keeping Some Hiding Places, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at F1; 
Gretchen Morgenson, Proposed Law on Bankruptcy Has Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 2005, at C1; see also David Shaftel & David H. Bundy, Impact of New 
Bankruptcy Provision on Domestic Asset Protection Trusts, 32 EST. PLAN. 28 
(2005) (discussing criticism of the act and the act’s relevance for domestic APTs). 
156. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000). See Shaftel & Bundy, supra note 155, at 30-
31; John E. Sullivan, New Rules, Old Game, TR. & EST., June 2005, at 59, 61. 
157. Perhaps another difference is that APTs are more likely to face judicial 
challenge. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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C. An Interest-Group Theory of Jurisdictional Competition 
Jurisdictional competition, sometimes also called regulatory 
competition, refers to the phenomenon of laws favorable to an indus-
try being enacted to attract business to a jurisdiction. The idea, identi-
fied first by Charles Tiebout, is that people and firms “vote with their 
feet,” moving from one jurisdiction to another based on changes in 
the local regulatory climate.158 Regulatory competition has been stud-
ied perhaps most notably in corporate law,159 but the phenomenon 
manifests itself in numerous other fields including securities, bank-
ruptcy, environmental, secured transactions, welfare, and antitrust 
law, to name just a few.160   
We have demonstrated that jurisdictional competition has influ-
enced the situs of trust funds totaling roughly $100 billion. More im-
portantly, we can trace our results entirely to those states that did not 
levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state. These 
findings have two important implications for the study of jurisdic-
tional competition generally.  
First, our findings lend support to public-choice theories of juris-
dictional competition.161 Much of the literature on jurisdictional 
competition models states as if they were well-functioning, profit-
maximizing firms. Hence it is commonly assumed that states seek to 
maximize tax and related revenues, which supplies the incentive to 
compete for business against other states.162 But as one of us has ar-
 
158. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). 
159. The classics are Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); and William L. 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974). See generally, Sitkoff, supra note 17, at 1140-43 (summarizing the de-
bate over regulatory competition in corporate law). 
160. See, e.g., Marcus Cole, “Delaware is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Ju-
risdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845 (2002); Richard 
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 
(1992); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 16, at 682-84 (collecting examples); see also 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Federalism and Property Law, 115 
YALE L.J.  ___ (forthcoming 2005) (proposing means to expand competition in 
state property law). 
161. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 17; William J. Carney, The Production of 
Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of 
Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto 
Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 761-62 (1987); Macey & 
Miller, supra note 17; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regula-
tion: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001). 
162. See supra note 11; cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corpora-
tion: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 1435, 1452-54 (1992) (contending that “the appropriate assumption is that a 
state’s interest in attracting incorporations shapes the behavior of the individuals 
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gued elsewhere, “this account represents an oversimplification of the 
political process. Individual legislators cannot fully internalize the 
benefits of increased tax revenues, which are in effect a public 
good.”163 We have shown that in the competition for trust business, 
states respond to competitive pressures, but it is impossible to link 
their incentive for doing so to immediate tax or other direct revenue 
increases. To repeat, only those states that did not levy an income tax 
on trust funds attracted from out of state experienced an increase in 
trust business from abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
True, in states that did not tax such trusts revenue may have in-
creased indirectly owing to taxes paid by financial institutions, their 
employees, and local lawyers. Assuming typical industry commission 
schedules, the $100 billion in trust funds that have moved carry with 
them perhaps as much as $1 billion in yearly trustees’ commis-
sions.164 Attracting trust business “is good for a state’s economy.”165 
But this is our point. The story of jurisdictional competition in trust 
law is a story of successful lobbying by local banks and trust lawyers, 
the principal beneficiaries of attracting new trust business to the 
state.166 On this account, whether jurisdictional competition leads to a 
race to the top, a race to the bottom, or somewhere in between de-
pends on whether the relevant interest group dynamic will prompt 
private-interest or public-regarding legislation. 
The genesis of the Alaska legislation in a fishing trip between two 
lawyers and a banker is a telling anecdote.167 Alaska did not seek to 
attract trust business; rather, a group of people who stood to benefit 
from a change in Alaska law persuaded Alaska lawmakers to do so. 
Moreover, Alaska has neither a fiduciary nor a personal income tax. 
As Sterk has observed, “Jurisdictions seeking to become trust havens 
. . . appear content to draw business to local financial institutions and 
lawyers, even without direct benefit to the public fisc.”168 
 
actually involved in the state’s lawmaking process”). 
163. Sitkoff, supra note 17, at 1143-44. 
164. See supra note 138. 
165. Sterk, supra note 32, at 2103. 
166. We thus extend the lawyer-focused analysis of Macey and Miller to in-
clude transactional lawyers in addition to litigators. See Macey & Miller, supra 
note 17. In separate work one of us finds a similar phenomenon in the jurisdictional 
competition for statutory business trusts, which unlike corporations (but like private 
trusts) do not pay franchise taxes. See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Rise of the Statutory 
Business Trust (manuscript on file with authors); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as Un-
corporation: A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (2005). In a related vein, 
Larry Ribstein has argued that lawyer licensing “encourages lawyers to participate 
in lawmaking by capitalizing the benefits of their law-improvement efforts in the 
value of the law license.” Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of 
Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 299 (2004). 
167. See text accompanying supra note 76. 
168. Sterk, supra note 74, at 1060. 
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Second, our results suggest that prior work that is based on the 
tax-revenue model, in which states are assumed to behave like profit-
maximizing firms, should be reconsidered. For example, based on 
calculations that show poaching incorporations from Delaware would 
not significantly increase the tax revenue of Nevada or other states, 
Kahan and Kamar have argued that jurisdictional competition in cor-
porate law is a “myth.”169 In a similar vein, drawing on the theory of 
industrial organization, Bebchuk and Hamdani have argued that there 
is little jurisdictional competition in corporate law because “a chal-
lenge to Delaware’s dominance by some other small state is unlikely 
to be profitable.”170 In our view, these approaches are based on a 
flawed premise. Even if attracting business does not have an immedi-
ate impact on a state’s tax revenue, local interest groups may none-
theless benefit from, and hence lobby for, laws that will attract new 
business.171 As we have seen, despite the lack of an immediate result-
ing increase in state tax revenue, jurisdictional competition is mani-
festly a force in the context of trust law. There is an ongoing race to 
abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, and so far the prize is on the 
order of $100 billion in trust business. 
D. Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes 
The extent to which the federal government should tax inter vivos 
and testamentary wealth transfers is currently before Congress.172 
Naturally, there is a thick academic literature on this question.173 
 
169. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 16. In fairness, it must be noted that Kahan 
and Kamar do give some attention to the public choice considerations we empha-
size. See id. at 694-99 (examining the incentives of local lawyers); id. at 728-30 
(criticizing the model of states as profit seekers). 
170. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 16, at 557. 
171. In a contemporaneous work, Roberta Romano offers a similar but more 
extended criticism of both the Kahan and Kamar and the Bebchuk and Hamdani 
articles. See Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant 
for Corporate Governance? 16-26 (Yale L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 307, 2005) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693484. 
172. For example, on April 13, 2005, the House of Representatives voted to 
make permanent the repeal of the estate and GST taxes that currently will take ef-
fect in 2010 for one year. Death Tax Repeal Permanency Act, H.R. 8, 109th Cong. 
(Roll No. 102, Apr. 13, 2005). 
173. See, e.g., Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
69 (1990); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, A Consumption Tax on Gifts 
and Bequests?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 657 (1998); Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Re-
formed Estate Tax with an Accessions Tax and an Income-Inclusion System, and 
Abandoning the Generation-Skipping Tax, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 551 (2003); Michael J. 
Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); Wojciech 
Kopczuk & Joel Slemrod, Tax Consequences on Wealth Accumulation and Transfers 
of the Rich, in in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN 
AMERICA 213 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sundén eds., 2003); Edward J. McCaf-
fery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); Col-
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Without getting embroiled in that debate, we make two modest ob-
servations. First, our results are consistent with other studies showing 
that people undertake significant measures to avoid these taxes.  
Second, if Congress wants to close the old loophole for succes-
sive life estates, it must decouple the duration of the GST tax exemp-
tion from state perpetuities law, a step that Congress is beginning to 
consider. On January 27, 2005, the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (JCT) issued a report in which it proposed closing the per-
petuities loophole in the GST tax by prohibiting the allocation of the 
transfer-tax exemption to a trust for the benefit of a generation more 
remote than the transferor’s grandchildren.174 The report gives two 
reasons for closing the loophole: (1) “[p]erpetual dynasty trusts are 
inconsistent with the” purpose of the GST tax, and (2) “perpetual dy-
nasty trusts deny equal treatment of all taxpayers because such trusts 
can only be established in the States that have repealed the mandatory 
rule against perpetuities.”175 
Our findings cast doubt on the importance of the JCT report’s 
second rationale. We do not deny that there may be additional trans-
actions costs to establishing a trust out-of-state. But our results show 
that settlors in states that have retained the Rule have not found these 
transaction costs to be prohibitive. On the other hand, for this reason 
our findings strongly support the JCT report’s first rationale, namely, 
that the federal wealth transfer taxes can easily be avoided in a man-
ner that Congress did not intend.  
 
loquium, Wealth Transfer Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 357 (1996) (discussing McCaf-
fery’s proposal to abolish the federal estate and gift tax); James R. Repetti, Democ-
racy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001); see also RETHINKING ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION (William G. Gale et al., eds., 2001) (collecting eleven essays on 
the debate over estate taxation). 
174. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 392-95. Our gross sum-
mary glosses over some of the proposal’s finer details. For other proposals, see 
John G. Shively, Note, The Death of the Life in Being—The Required Federal Re-
sponse to State Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 392-
95 (2000); Report on Reform, supra note 50, at 268-74. 
175. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 13, at 393. The report also pro-
jects that $300 million in tax revenue would be gained from 2005 through 2014 
from closing the perpetuities loophole in the GST tax. Id. at 428. We are dubious of 
the report’s revenue projection. As detailed above, our data do not allow us to esti-
mate the tax revenue that would be gained from closing the perpetuities loophole in 
the GST tax, and there is no indication that the Committee staff has better data. Ac-
cording to a later report, the Committee’s estate and gift tax revenue projections are 
based on a sample of estate tax returns drawn from those filed in 2001. JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING PROCEDURES AND 
METHODOLOGIES USED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 32 
(2005), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-1-05.pdf. We are skeptical, how-
ever, that one can make a reliable estimate of the number and volume of transfer-
tax-exempt perpetual trusts, and then incorporate actuarial information about the 
trusts’ beneficiaries, from a sampling of estate tax returns. Neither Committee re-
port provides further specifics on the Committee’s estimation methodology. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Essay presents the results of the first empirical study of the 
domestic jurisdictional competition for trust funds. In order to take 
advantage of a loophole in the federal estate tax, a host of states have 
abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities. In order to allow settlors to 
shield their assets from creditors, a handful of states have validated 
self-settled asset protection trusts.  Both abolishing the Rule and vali-
dating asset protection trusts represent significant departures from the 
common law of trusts.   
Using standard difference-in-difference regression analysis of 
state-level panel data assembled from annual reports to federal bank-
ing authorities by institutional trustees, we estimate that through 2003 
a state’s abolition of the Rule increased its trust assets by $6 billion (a 
20% increase on average) and increased its average trust account size 
by $200,000. These estimates imply that roughly $100 billion in trust 
funds have moved to take advantage of the abolition of the Rule. By 
contrast, our examination of validating self-settled asset protection 
trusts yielded indeterminate results. We intend to reexamine the ef-
fect of validating asset protection trusts when more data becomes 
available. 
Interestingly, states that levied an income tax on trust funds at-
tracted from out of state experienced no observable increase in trust 
business from abolishing the Rule Against Perpetuities. Because this 
finding implies that abolishing the Rule does not directly increase a 
state’s tax revenue, it bears on the current scholarly debate over the 
nature of jurisdictional competition. In spite of the lack of direct tax 
revenue from attracting trust business, the jurisdictional competition 
for trust funds is patently real and profound. Accordingly, we believe 
that jurisdictional competition in trust law is best understood in light 
of public-choice theory. The immediate benefits of attracting new 
trust business flow to local lawyers and institutional trustees. 
In addition to their theoretical implications, our findings also 
speak to live policy issues concerning state property law and federal 
tax law. Even if some states retain the Rule Against Perpetuities, the 
Rule will in effect apply only to real property within those states. 
When it matters, people move their financial assets to escape the 
Rule’s reach. The federal wealth transfer taxes have thus mortally 
wounded the once-mighty Rule by reducing it to a mere transaction 
cost. As a result, Congress has inadvertantly transformed the question 
of trust duration into an issue of federal tax law. If Congress wants to 
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close the successive-life-estates loophole in the transfer taxes, it must 
decouple the duration of the GST tax exemption from state perpetui-
ties law. 
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Figure 1: Total Reported Trust Assets 
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Figure 5: Average Account Size
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Figure 6: Average Account Size in 
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TABLE 1: REPORTED STATE TRUST ASSETS (IN BILLIONS) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 













Abolish*NoFIT      14.0** 
 (4.51) 
  
Year Abolish   .001 
 (3.52) 
     
Year Before Abolition   -1.98 
 (2.10) 
     
Two Years Before 
Abolition 
  -1.63 
 (1.40) 
     
Years Abolished 
 
      2.18* 
    (1.37) 
.35 
   (.49) 
Years Abolished 
Squared 
      -.13** 
    (.05) 
-.07+ 
 (.040) 
Years Abolished *No 
FIT 
       4.97** 
    (1.53) 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT 
       -.18* 
    (.08) 









   (2.74) 
-2.17 
 (2.13) 











   (1.54) 
3.00+ 
 (1.61) 











    (1.80) 
-2.17 
 (2.13) 



























    (.07) 
.18** 
   (.08) 
Test Abolish, APT, 
Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0030 .0041 .0103  .0004   
Test Yr, Yr2, *NoFIT       .032 .001 
R-Square .7736 .8044 .8045 .9267 .8046 .8071 .8066 .8047 
State-Specific Trends No No No Yes No No No No 
Exc. AK, DE, RI, MA, No No No No Yes No No No 
N=940 for columns 1-4 and 6-8; N=874 for column 3.  **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions include 
state and year dummies and a constant. Years 1985-2003. 
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TABLE 2: LOG REPORTED STATE TRUST ASSETS   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Abolish RAP .23* 
     (.10) 
.20* 
     (.10) 
.17* 




Abolish*NoFIT    .52** 
 (.17) 
  






    -.003 









     .009** 
 (.003) 
APTs  .28 
       (.22) 
-.04 
       (.22) 
.09 
       (.22) 
.33 
     (.24) 
-.15 
       (.19) 
USRAP  .092 
    (.056) 
.035 
    (.05) 
.11* 
    (.056) 
.06 
  (.05) 
.06 
    (.053) 
NoFIT  -.29+ 
       (.15) 
-.17 
       (.16) 
-.41** 
       (.16) 
-.16 
     (.14) 
.056 
       (.09) 
Population (Millions)  -.19** 
   (.05) 
.15 
   (.10) 
-.15** 
   (.05) 
-.19** 
  (.06 
-.14** 
   (.045) 












Test Abolish, APT, 
Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0248 .1152 .0002   
Test Yr, Yr2, *NoFIT     .1332 <.0001 
R-Square .9104 .9127 .9619 .9138 .9199 .9199 
State-Specific Trends No No Yes No No No 
N=940 for columns 1-5 and 7-8; N=874 for column 3.  **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-
White robust standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions include state and year dummies and a constant. Years 
1985-2003.   
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TABLE 3: STATE AVERAGE ACCOUNT SIZE (IN THOUSANDS)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 













Abolish*NoFIT      221* 
 (110) 
  
Year Abolish   -66 
 (65) 
     
Year Before Abolition   -67 
 (63) 
     
Two Years Before 
Abolition 
  -133* 
 (54) 
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 (2.08) 






















































Joint Test Abolish, 
APT, Abolish*NoFIT 
 .0001 .0001 .0015  .0065   
Test Yr, Yr2, *NoFIT       .33 <.0001 
R-Square .7445 .7594 .7608 .7602 .7078 .7629 .7619 .7619 
State-Specific Time 
Trends 
No No No Yes No No No No 
Excluding RI, MA, DE, 
and AK 
No No No No Yes No No No 
N=940 for columns 1-5 and 7-8; N=874 for column 3.  **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses. All regressions include state and year dummies and a constant. Years 1985-2003. 
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TABLE 4: REPORTED NUMBER OF STATE ACCOUNTS (IN THOUSANDS)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 









Abolish*NoFIT    7.54+ 
 (4.01) 
  
















     -.51 
 (.65) 




















































Joint test Years,  
Years2, *NoFIT 
    .0423 .0001 
State-Specific Time 
Trends 
No No Yes No No No 
R-Square .8239 .8270 .9301 .8279 .8274 .8274 
N=940 for columns 1-5 and 7-8; N=874 for column 3.  **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. All regressions include state and year dummies and a constant.  Years 1985-2003. 
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Alabama — — — YES 
Alaska 19974 
1996,  
repealed 2000 1997 NO 
Arizona 1998 1995 — YES 
Arkansas — — — NO 
California — 1992 — YES 
Colorado 2001 1991 —5 YES 
Connecticut — 1989 — NO 
Delaware 19956 — 1997 NO 
Florida 20017 1988 — 
YES,8  
NO beginning 2001 
Georgia — 1990 — NO 
Hawaii — 1992 — NO 
Idaho 1957 — — YES 
Illinois 1998  — NO 
Indiana — 1991 — YES 
Iowa — — — YES 
Kansas — 1992 — YES 
Kentucky — — — YES 
                                            
1 Except as noted otherwise, this table is current as the statutes appeared on Lexis or Westlaw at year 
end 2004. 
2 Except as noted otherwise, we define abolition to include any reform that would allow a settlor to 
create a perpetual trust of intangible personal property.  Accordingly, our definition of abolition includes: 
(1) outright repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities with respect to interests in a trust funded with intangible 
personal property; (2) reconfiguration of the Rule with respect to such trusts as a default that applies unless 
the settlor provides otherwise in the trust instrument; and (3) an exemption from the Rule for interests in a 
trust funded with intangible personal property over which the trustee has the power to sell (i.e., the trust 
does not suspend the power of alienation).  See supra note __ and text accompanying. 
3 A YES in this column indicates that the state might levy a fiduciary income tax on the basis of an in-
state trustee, in-state trust administration, or an in-state situs, even if the trust was settled by a nonresident 
for the benefit of nonresident beneficiaries and the trust consists entirely of intangible personal property.  A 
NO indicates that state law clearly excludes such a trust from income taxation.  We resolved ambiguity in 
favor of YES.  See supra note __ and text accompanying. 
4 In 2000 Alaska established a 1000-year limitation on the duration of powers of appointment, enacted 
new language that more clearly abolishes the Rule Against Perpetuities, and repealed its enactment of 
USRAP. 
5 See supra note __. 
6 Prior to 1995 it was possible to have a perpetual trust in Delaware, but this option was rarely invoked 
because of I.R.C. §2041.  See supra note __. 
7 In 2001 Florida amended its enactment of USRAP to provide for a 360-year perpetuities period for 
property held in trust.  Because 360 years is significantly longer than is possible through the use of a saving 
clause, we count Florida as having abolished the Rule. 
8 Although Florida does not have a fiduciary income tax, it does have an intangible personal property 
tax, and before 2001 trustees of Florida situs trusts were required to pay this tax. 









Louisiana — — — YES 
Maine 1999 — — YES 
Maryland 1998 — — 
NO,  
YES beginning 1988 
Massachusetts — 1990 — YES 
Michigan — 1988 — NO 
Minnesota — 1991 — NO 
Mississippi — — — YES 
Missouri 2001 — —9 NO 
Montana — 1989 — YES 
Nebraska 2002 1989 — NO 
Nevada —10 1987 1999 NO 
New Hampshire 2004 — — NO 
New Jersey 1999 
1991,  
repealed 1999 — NO 
New Mexico — 1992 — YES 
New York — — — NO 
North Carolina — 1995 — NO 
North Dakota — 1991 — YES 
Ohio 1999 — — 
NO,  
YES beginning 2003 
Oklahoma — — 200411 
NO,  
YES beginning 1994 
Oregon — 1990 — YES 
Pennsylvania — — — NO 
Rhode Island 1999 — 1999 NO 
South Carolina — 1987 — YES 
South Dakota 1983 — — NO 
Tennessee — 1994 — NO 
Texas — — — NO 
Utah 200412 1998 2004 
YES,  
NO beginning 200413 
Vermont — — — NO 
Virginia 2000 2000 — YES 
Washington —14 — — NO 
                                            
9 See supra note __. 
10 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
11 Oklahoma’s statute limits settlors to a single asset protection trust and caps the permissible initial 
funding at $1 million. 
12 Utah’s statute, which is unclear, appears to establish a 1,000 year perpetuities period effective 
December 31, 2003.  Given the length of this period, we treat Utah as having abolished the Rule. 
13 Only trusts that “first became” Utah trusts “on or after January 1, 2004” qualify for exemption from 
the income tax.   
14 Washington extended its perpetuities period to 150 years effective January 1, 2002.  Because 150 
years is not significantly longer than is possible through the use of a saving clause, we do not count 










West Virginia — 1992 — NO 
Wisconsin 196915 — — 
YES,  
NO after 1999 
Wyoming 200316 — — NO 
 
                                            
15 See supra note __. 
16 Wyoming conditions the nonapplicability of the Rule on a provision in the trust instrument providing 
for the termination of the trust not later than 1,000 years after its creation.  Given the length of this period, 
we treat Wyoming as having abolished the Rule. 
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APPENDIX A:  EXTENDED TREATMENT OF DATA LIMITATIONS  
Exclusion of nonreporting trustees. Because our dataset includes only trust assets 
held by federally-reporting institutional trustees, our study does not include the entire 
universe of trust funds.  Further, because inter vivos trusts are not publicly-recorded, 
there is no reliable data on the proportion of trust assets held by institutional trustees as 
compared to individuals.17  There are, however, good reasons to suppose that our dataset 
captures the trust funds most likely to be sensitive to the interaction of perpetuities and 
tax laws. 
 
First, as discussed earlier, in order to ensure the desired choice of law, out-of-state 
settlors are all but required to choose a trustee located in the state whose law the settlor 
wants to govern the trust.18  Thus, unless the settlor knows someone who lives in the 
chosen state and is willing to name that person as trustee, the settlor has little choice but 
to choose a bank or other corporate fiduciary.  Second, because a transfer-tax-exempt 
perpetual trust is designed to last in perpetuity, choosing an institutional trustee avoids 
the difficult problem of providing for trustee succession after everyone known to the 
settlor is dead.  Third, anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of professional trustees 
has become more common, particularly for larger and more sophisticated trusts.19  
 
To the extent that our data may not include some trusts assets that have moved to 
take advantage of the abolition of the RAP, their omission biases our results down, 
causing us to understate the magnitude of the phenomenon.   
 
Inclusion of charitable trusts. Although charitable trust funds held by institutional 
fiduciaries are included in the data, we do not believe that their inclusion biases our 
results upward.   
 
As a theoretical matter, the distribution of charitable trust funds across states 
should not be affected by changes in state perpetuities, state tax, or federal tax law. 
Charitable trusts are privileged with an exemption from the RAP and from state and 
federal taxation. Thus neither perpetuities nor tax law supplies a reason to settle a 
charitable trust out of state.  
 
As an econometric matter, the differences in state trust assets caused by the 
inclusion of charitable trusts should be removed by state fixed effects, year dummies, and 
state-specific time trends. If not, the inclusion of charitable trusts at worst creates some 
noise, which would decrease our coefficient estimates and thus would cause us to 
understate the magnitude of the phenomenon.   
                                            
17 See Sitkoff, Agency Cost, supra note __, at 633 n. 57.  
18 See text accompanying supra notes ___.  
19 See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note __, at 638-40; Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of 
Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 775 (2000); see also Barbara R. Hauser, Appreciating 
Corporate Trustees, TR. & EST., Aug. 2005, at 52 (noting an increased willingness in the last ten years to 
recommend use of a corporate trustee).   
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Banking reform and charter jurisdiction. In the main text we address the concern 
that bank mergers or consolidations could bias our results. A related concern is that 
nationally-chartered institutions, which are regulated by the OCC and include some rather 
large entities (such as the Wells Fargo banks and the Citicorp banks), may report all of 
their assets in only one state. To the extent that this is true, however, the reporting 
location tends to be in large financial centers such as New York rather than in the small 
states that were the first to abolish the RAP. Thus, if there is bias, once again it would 
tend to cut against a significant positive finding. Further, on an anecdotal level, at least 
several nationally-chartered institutions maintain separately reporting offices. For 
example, Wells Fargo has independently-chartered and hence separately-reporting 
entities in Delaware, South Dakota, and Alaska; Citibank has separately-reporting entities 
in South Dakota and Delaware; and Bank of America has an independently-chartered and 
separately-reporting Delaware trust office.20  
 
                                            
20 See http://www2.fdic.gov/structur/trust/search.asp to find institutions, date of charter, chartering 
institution, and state. Maintaining several separately-charted institutions is evidently a common practice. 
See Jonathan Epstein, U.S. Trust Wants to Set Up in Del., NEWS J., Juan. 27, 2000, at 7B; Jonathan D. 
Epstein, Financial “Climate” Attracts SunTrust, Tiedemann Trust, NEWS J., Nov. 4, 1999, at 7B. 
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APPENDIX B:  TRUST ASSETS PER PERSON  
Appendix Table 1 considers trust assets per person as the dependent variable. This 
variable is relevant for several reasons. First, by denominating trust assets by person, we 
overweight the influence of large transfers to small states (e.g., Delaware and South 
Dakota), and these states may be the most responsive to state competition. Second, this 
variable divides trust assets by population, a factor likely to influence the amount of trust 
assets in a state. Our findings (except for the USRAP coefficient) are quite similar to 
those of Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: REPORTED STATE TRUST ASSETS PER PERSON (IN THOUSANDS) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 













Abolish*NoFIT      3.28** 
 (.74) 
  
Year Abolish   -.35 
   (.60) 
     
Year Before Abolition   -.14 
   (.92) 
     
Two Years Before 
Abolition 
  -.16 
   (1.04) 
     
Years Abolished       .46** 
    (.25) 
.067 
     (.078) 
Years Abolished 
Squared 
      -.021* 





       1.19** 
    (.26) 
Years Abolished 
Squared*NoFIT 
       -.023+ 
    (.013) 









    (2.13) 
3.72+ 
 (1.97) 











     (.30) 
-.45 
 (.29) 











    (.37) 
-.028 
 (.36) 
Income per Capita/1000  .042 
       (.061) 
.048 











Test Abolish, APT, 
*NoFIT 
 .0003 .0004 .1243  .0054   
Test Yr, Yr2, *NoFIT       .0117 >.0001 
R-Square .7713 .7894 .7906 .9204 .5725 .7953 .7988 .8051 
State-Specific Time 
Trends 
No No No Yes No No No No 
Excluding RI, MA, DE, 
and AK 
No No No No Yes No No No 
N=940 for columns 1-4 and 6-8; N=874 for column 3.  **sig. at <.01 level; *sig. at <.05 level; +sig. at <.10 level. Huber-White robust standard errors reported in 
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